Shilo Thomas Joseph v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
2019 SC 0623
Ky.Oct 25, 2021Background
- Defendant Shilo Joseph went to his former partner Jerrica Goodlowe’s apartment after a birthday party; he either tried to retrieve belongings or unlawfully entered the dwelling.
- Surveillance showed Joseph arrived before the victim, Antonio Starks; the apartment door was damaged and a physical confrontation occurred on the stairwell/landing.
- Joseph stabbed Antonio during the altercation; Antonio died shortly thereafter. Joseph claimed self‑defense (including fear of falling and being attacked) and argued he only sought his property.
- A jury convicted Joseph of second‑degree manslaughter (imperfect self‑defense theory), first‑degree burglary, and found him a second‑degree persistent felony offender; the trial court later designated him a violent offender; total sentence = 20 years.
- On direct appeal Joseph raised multiple claims: improper comments on post‑Miranda silence, prosecutorial misstatement of burglary law, entitlement to directed verdicts (burglary and PFO), exclusion of evidence of victim’s threats (KRE 803(3)), limitations on voir dire about self‑defense, and error in post‑judgment classification as a violent offender.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Commonwealth impermissibly commented on Joseph’s post‑Miranda silence | Comments compared timing of statements to show Joseph had time to fabricate; not a comment on silence after Miranda | Statements implied Joseph refused to tell police his story and were Fifth Amendment‑violative | No violation: no evidence Joseph was Mirandized or in custody when silent; court treats as permissible temporal comparison; cross‑examination reviewed for abuse of discretion and closing for misconduct (none) |
| Prosecutor’s alleged misstatement of burglary law in closing | Argued that kicking door in could satisfy both unlawful entry and intent, and reclaiming personal property could be burglary | Misstated law: intent to commit an additional crime is required; reclaiming own property or using bathroom is not burglary | Misstatement acknowledged but not flagrant; jury properly instructed; evidence of intent to commit a crime was strong; no reversal |
| Whether directed verdict on first‑degree burglary was required | Commonwealth: evidence (ownership dispute over trunk, admission he intended to take trunk, unlawful entry, stabbing) supported intent to commit crime in dwelling | Joseph: he only went to retrieve belongings so lacked intent to commit crime necessary for burglary | Denied: reasonable juror could find intent to commit a crime (ownership dispute over trunk), so directed verdict not warranted |
| Whether exclusion of question to Jerrica about victim saying he would fight Joseph (KRE 803(3)) was error | Commonwealth: inadmissible or defendant not aware of statement (Saylor) | Defense: statement was victim’s then‑existing state of mind and admissible in self‑defense cases even if uncommunicated | Trial court erred in excluding, but error was harmless given other evidence of victim’s aggression; no new outcome likely |
| Whether trial court improperly limited voir dire on self‑defense | Commonwealth: court properly limited voir dire to conceptual questions and avoided instructing law or polling jurors on legal standards | Joseph: needed fuller questioning to probe juror biases about use of force and self‑defense | No abuse of discretion; court allowed conceptual questions sufficient to identify biased jurors and avoided educating venire on law; not fundamentally unfair |
| Whether court erred by amending judgment to add violent‑offender finding and whether PFO directed verdict warranted | Commonwealth: amendment appropriate and conviction of enumerated offense automatically supports violent offender status; evidence showed defendant was 18 at prior conviction for PFO | Joseph: insufficient proof defendant was 18 at time of prior felony; trial court should not have amended judgment over objection | Affirmed: paralegal testimony supported age at prior offense so PFO instruction was proper; amendment under RCr 10.10 was clerical correction and appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (post‑Miranda silence generally cannot be used to impeach or penalize a defendant)
- Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (pre‑arrest silence may be used for impeachment)
- Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (post‑arrest, pre‑Miranda silence may be used for impeachment in absence of Miranda assurances)
- Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (using post‑Miranda silence to show sanity was fundamentally unfair)
- Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (pre‑custodial, pre‑Miranda silence is not automatically protected by Fifth Amendment)
- Bartley v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2014) (Miranda warnings generally bar use of ensuing silence; state‑law framing of Doyle principles)
- Hedges v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1996) (burglary intent element requires intent to commit crime beyond trespass)
- Wilson v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1977) (threats by deceased admissible on issue of who was aggressor even if not communicated to defendant)
- Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008) (conviction of enumerated offense automatically supports violent offender classification)
- Rucker v. Commonwealth, 521 S.W.3d 562 (Ky. 2017) (contemporaneity requirement under KRE 803(3) for state‑of‑mind statements)