Shew v. Malloy
994 F. Supp. 2d 234
D. Conn.2014Background
- Connecticut enacted Public Act 13-3 (amended by P.A.13-220), banning specified makes/models of semiautomatic firearms defined as "assault weapons" and broadly prohibiting "large capacity magazines" (LCMs) over ten rounds, with limited exceptions and a declaration/registration window for existing owners.
- Plaintiffs (individuals and gun-related organizations) sued under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the law as violating the Second Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and as unconstitutionally vague.
- The law uses a one‑feature (generic‑features) test to capture many semiautomatic firearms and also bans parts that can be "rapidly" assembled into banned weapons; LCMs are defined to include devices that can be readily converted to accept >10 rounds.
- The statute contains exemptions for law‑enforcement, certain government employees, and military personnel to possess such weapons and magazines in the course of official duties (and in many instances off‑duty), and allows limited transition/registration relief for some retirees and prior possessors.
- The district court concluded the banned weapons and LCMs are in "common use," the statute substantially burdens Second Amendment rights but survives intermediate scrutiny as substantially related to public safety/crime‑control objectives; the court rejected the equal‑protection and void‑for‑vagueness challenges.
- Judgment: plaintiffs’ summary‑judgment motion denied; defendants’ cross‑motion for summary judgment granted; preliminary injunction denied as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Second Amendment — assault weapons & LCMs | The bans target firearms/magazines commonly used for lawful self‑defense and thus are categorically unconstitutional or require strict scrutiny for in‑home possession | The bans only marginally affect core self‑defense rights, leave many lawful firearms available, and are subject to intermediate scrutiny | The court found the items are in common use and the law imposes a substantial burden, but intermediate scrutiny applies and the statute survives as substantially related to public safety and crime control |
| Equal Protection — exemptions for officials | Exempting police/military and certain officials creates an unjustified classification favoring selected groups | Exempt personnel are not similarly situated to the public due to training, duties, and public‑safety roles; classification is rational | Plaintiffs failed to show similarly situated persons are treated differently; exemptions permissible and do not violate Equal Protection |
| Vagueness — definitions and terms ("grip," "copies or duplicates," "rapidly assembled," capacity) | Key terms lack sufficient notice and mens rea; statute criminalizes conduct without clear boundaries or scienter | Statutory terms have ordinary meanings; context, feature tests, model lists, manufacturer markings, and available resources give fair notice; facial vagueness requires showing the law is invalid in all applications | The court held challenged terms are not impermissibly vague in all applications and survive facial vagueness review |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense and limited categories of presumptively lawful regulations)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated the Second Amendment against the states)
- Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (articulated two‑step Second Amendment framework and endorsed heightened scrutiny when core self‑defense is burdened)
- United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) (applied multi‑step approach to Second Amendment analysis; heightened scrutiny for substantial burdens)
- Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (treated semiautomatic rifles and >10‑round magazines as commonly used and analyzed constitutionality under heightened scrutiny)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (void‑for‑vagueness standards; criminal statutes must provide fair notice and not encourage arbitrary enforcement)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial challenges require showing no set of circumstances under which statute is valid)