SHEVLING v. MAJOR, 2026 S.D. 27

Shevling and Major were married nearly 20 years, served in the military, and signed a July 2020 separation agreement providing $1,500 monthly maintenance and 20% of Major’s military retirement pay to Shevling. 1
The parties later incorporated parts of the separation agreement into a February 2021 divorce decree, but Major allegedly missed maintenance payments and failed to pay any retirement share. 2
After Major retired in February 2024, Shevling sought contempt and modification, and the circuit court denied modification, denied contempt, and reduced her retirement share to 16.1%. 3
DFAS rejected Shevling’s direct-payment application because the court order lacked required retirement-calculation details and SBP paperwork requirements. 4
The circuit court later found no fraud or coercion, held the decree too vague for contempt on retirement payments, but awarded $5,000 in missed maintenance and 8% interest. 5
Both parties appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Rule 60(b) relief and modification of property division 7	Shevling claimed fraud, duress, and unfair division justified vacating or modifying the decree.	Major argued the property division was final and not modifiable absent fraud.	Denied; no abuse of discretion. 8
Calculation of military retirement share 9	Shevling argued she was entitled to the full agreed 20% of disposable retired pay.	Major supported the court’s coverture-based 16.1% calculation.	Reversed; Shevling gets 20% of disposable retired pay. 10
Interest rate on maintenance arrearages 11	Shevling sought statutory 10% interest, not 8%.	Major argued the agreement’s 8% rate controlled.	Reversed; apply statutory 10% interest. 12
Calculation of maintenance arrearages 13	Shevling said the $5,000 arrearage was unsupported and understated.	Major argued the court correctly credited his $2,500 payment.	Affirmed; $5,000 award upheld. 14
Contempt and due process claims 15	Shevling argued Major should be held in contempt and the court was biased.	Major argued the orders were too vague, no contempt basis existed, and no bias occurred.	Affirmed; contempt denial and no due process violation. 16

Estate of Mack v. Hiller, 17 N.W.3d 874 (S.D. 2025) (abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 60(b) relief 17)
Estate of Olson, 757 N.W.2d 219 (S.D. 2008) (clear-error review requires definite and firm conviction of mistake 18)
Beermann v. Beermann, 526 N.W.2d 127 (S.D. 1995) (property-settlement divorce decrees are final and generally not modifiable 19)
Parker v. Parker, 985 N.W.2d 58 (S.D. 2023) (military retirement benefits are marital assets and coverture/frozen-benefit principles apply 20)
Coffey v. Coffey, 888 N.W.2d 805 (S.D. 2016) (divorce stipulations are interpreted as contracts 21)
Taylor v. Taylor, 928 N.W.2d 458 (S.D. 2019) (civil contempt requires a clear, specific, and unambiguous order and willful disobedience 22)
Roth v. Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651 (S.D. 2003) (constitutional due process claims are reviewed de novo 23)