Sherrod v. McHugh
249 F. Supp. 3d 85
D.D.C.2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Sherrod et al.) seek leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to clarify prior allegations and add a negligence claim against Individual Defendant Diane Schulz.
- District Defendants do not oppose the motion; Defendant Schulz opposes only the added negligence count.
- Schulz contends the negligence claim was added in bad faith (motivated by insurance coverage), that negligence contradicts plaintiffs’ intentional-tort allegations, and that the negligence count fails to specify a duty beyond "act reasonably."
- The Court reviewed standards for Rule 15(a)(2) amendments and bad-faith denial, and found Schulz’s allegations of bad faith conclusory and unsupported by extrinsic evidence.
- The Court explained plaintiffs may plead inconsistent theories (negligence and intentional tort) if the negligence claim is distinctly pled and rests on a different factual scenario.
- The Court held the negligence claim adequately pleads the applicable standard of care (reasonable care under the circumstances) and granted leave to file the Second Amended Complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether leave to amend should be denied as brought in bad faith | Sherrod: amendment clarifies facts and adds negligence claim based on discovery | Schulz: amendment was motivated by knowledge of insurance coverage and thus in bad faith | Denied — Schulz offered only conclusory assertions and no extrinsic evidence of bad faith; Rule 15 favors leave to amend |
| Whether adding negligence is futile because it contradicts intentional-tort claims | Sherrod: may plead both negligence and intentional torts based on same transaction if distinct | Schulz: negligence inconsistent with prior intentional-tort allegations | Denied — Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3) permits inconsistent claims; plaintiffs pled negligence as a distinct factual theory |
| Whether negligence count sufficiently pleads a duty/standard of care | Sherrod: pleads duty as default reasonable care under the circumstances | Schulz: complaint fails to identify a specific duty beyond "act reasonably" | Denied — District of Columbia law applies a reasonable-care standard; detailed specification not required under Rule 8 |
| Whether the proposed negligence claim is duplicative or plainly unlikely to succeed | Sherrod: negligence alleges separate factual scenario (duty to prevent unlawful arrest/withdraw false complaint) | Schulz: claim duplicates or is bound to fail | Denied — court finds claim not duplicative and cognizable |
Key Cases Cited
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (standards for allowing leave to amend)
- Monahan v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275 (2d Cir.) (party alleging bad-faith amendment must show more than conclusory assertions)
- Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858 (3d Cir.) (extrinsic evidence often required to show bad faith in amendment)
- Roller Bearing Co. of Am. v. Am. Software, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Conn.) (discussing proof required to deny amendment for bad faith)
- Dingle v. District of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C.) (permitting inconsistent theories; cannot recover on both claims)
- Dormu v. District of Columbia, 795 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C.) (negligence claim must be distinctly pled and rest on a factual scenario separate from intentional tort)
- O’Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337 (D.C. 1982) (standard of care in D.C. negligence actions: reasonable care under the circumstances)