Sherrell Johnson v. Evanston Insurance Company, Denyce Moss and John Moss, 368 So.3d 703

Owners Denyce and John Moss owned a four-unit building; a second‑floor rental unit had an inward‑swinging door that opened onto a dark stairway to a first‑floor laundry room. The stairway lacked a top landing and handrails. A deadbolt with its key on the door was present the day of the incident.
Plaintiff Sherrell Johnson (touring the unit with her son) opened that unmarked door, stepped into darkness and fell down the stairs; she sued the Mosses and their insurer for negligence/premises liability.
Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing (1) Johnson was a trespasser; (2) the hazard (dark stairway behind a closed door) was open and obvious; and (3) the tenant (son) assumed responsibility for the premises under the lease/La. R.S. 9:3221.
The trial court granted summary judgment, reasoning Johnson unreasonably stepped into darkness and the condition was open and obvious.
The court of appeal reversed and remanded, holding genuine issues of material fact existed about whether the condition (a cluster of defects and concealment) was unreasonably dangerous and whether defendants met their summary judgment burden.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether summary judgment was proper on the ground the condition was "open and obvious" so no duty existed	Johnson: the hazard was a concealed "trap" (unmarked door, no landing or handrails, no exterior light switch), raising a genuine issue of breach	Mosses: the darkness/stairs were open and obvious and Johnson unreasonably stepped into the dark	Reversed: court found the complained‑of condition was a cluster of contemporaneous factors (not just darkness) that could be hidden; reasonable jurors could disagree on breach, so summary judgment improper
Whether plaintiff's status as trespasser precluded recovery or reduced duty to refrain only from willful/wanton misconduct	Johnson: she was lawfully on premises/touring and in any event entrant status does not alone define duty	Mosses: she was unlawfully on property, so only duty was to avoid willful/wanton injury	Rejected: court applied modern negligence duty‑risk analysis and held entrant status is not dispositive; Cates‑style duty analysis controls
Whether the lease/La. R.S. 9:3221 bars liability because tenant assumed condition responsibility	Johnson: lease language did not transfer full responsibility for structural defects to tenant	Mosses: the tenant assumed responsibility for premises condition, so owner not liable absent notice	Rejected: court held lease language was insufficient to meet the statute's assumption standard; summary judgment on this basis improper

Planchard v. New Hotel Monteleone, LLC, 332 So.3d 623 (La. 2021) (summary judgment standard and de novo appellate review)
Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 639 So.2d 730 (La. 1994) (definition of material fact and when summary judgment is appropriate)
Bufkin v. Felipe's Louisiana, LLC, 171 So.3d 851 (La. 2014) (discussion of open and obvious concept in premises liability)
Cates v. Beauregard, 328 So.2d 367 (La. 1976) (entrant status not sole determinant of landowner duty)
Warren v. Kenny, 64 So.3d 841 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2011) (clustered conditions can defeat an open‑and‑obvious defense)
Jones v. Stewart, 203 So.3d 384 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2016) (darkness can conceal hazards and preclude open‑and‑obvious resolution)
Lomax v. Transdev Servs., Inc., 331 So.3d 368 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2021) (overall circumstance analysis may create genuine issues of material fact)
Weiland v. King, 281 So.2d 688 (La. 1973) (absence of lighting and handrails can create a concealed stairway ‘‘trap")