Sheriff v. Gillie
136 S. Ct. 1594
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- Ohio’s Attorney General appoints private lawyers as “special counsel” (independent contractors) to collect debts owed to state agencies; special counsel are paid a percentage and may litigate with AG approval.
- The Attorney General requires special counsel to use official Attorney General letterhead when communicating with debtors.
- Special counsel (petitioners) sent collection letters on AG letterhead to Meadows and Gillie that identified the debt, included sender contact info, noted the sender was a debt collector, and identified the sender as “special” or “outside” counsel to the AG.
- Meadows and Gillie sued under the FDCPA, alleging the letterhead was false or misleading in violation of §1692e; Ohio’s AG intervened to defend the practice and sought a declaration that special counsel are state officers exempt from the FDCPA.
- District Court granted summary judgment for defendants (AG and special counsel); Sixth Circuit reversed, holding special counsel were not state officers and remanding the §1692e question for trial on whether letters would mislead an unsophisticated consumer.
- Supreme Court assumed, arguendo, special counsel are not state officers but held as a matter of law that use of AG letterhead did not violate §1692e and reversed the Sixth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether special counsel are "officers" exempt from the FDCPA | Gillie: Special counsel are not state officers; thus FDCPA applies | Sheriff: Special counsel act as officers/agents of the State and are exempt | Court: Assumed arguendo they are not officers; decision disposes of case on other ground (did not decide exemption) |
| Whether using AG letterhead violates §1692e general ban on false/misleading representations | Gillie: Letterhead creates false impression letters come from AG office and misleads/intimidates debtors | Sheriff: Letterhead accurately conveys they act on AG’s behalf; letters identify sender and debt-collector status | Court: Use of AG letterhead is not false or misleading as it identifies the principal (AG) and names the agent; not a §1692e violation |
| Whether use of AG letterhead violates §1692e(9) (simulating/state authorization) | Gillie: Letterhead could falsely imply authorization/approval by State | Sheriff: AG authorized/required use of his letterhead; no false claim of authorization | Court: No violation of §1692e(9) because AG expressly authorized/required the use; no false representation |
| Whether use of AG letterhead violates §1692e(14) (use of a name other than true name) | Gillie: Using AG name instead of private firm’s name misrepresents identity | Sheriff: Letters identify AG as principal and provide special counsel contact and designation; not a false name | Court: No §1692e(14) violation—special counsel act as AG’s agents and letters accurately disclose affiliation and payment address |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (1906) (syllabus separation and citation practice)
- Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (federal courts should avoid interfering with States’ arrangements for conducting government)
- Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (respect for state governmental structure when interpreting federal law)