345 P.3d 377
Okla.2015Background
- Barbara Shepard injured at work in 2005; Workers' Compensation Court awarded continuing medical maintenance limited to prescription pain management and periodic monitoring by her treating physician.
- Shepard reopened her claim (2010–11); reopening affirmed that prior award of continuing medical maintenance remained in effect.
- In 2012–2014 respondents sought review to limit prescriptions under newly enacted 85 O.S. § 326(G), which incorporated the Official Disability Guidelines (ODG) and Oklahoma Treatment Guidelines (OTG).
- A court-ordered independent examiner applied the ODG/OTG and concluded Shepard did not need continuing medical maintenance under those Guidelines; the trial court ordered future treatment conform to ODG/OTG.
- Shepard sought Supreme Court review, arguing retroactive application of § 326(G)/Guidelines violated constitutional protection of accrued rights and that the Guidelines improperly restricted treating-physician evidence.
- The Supreme Court held § 326(G) and its incorporated Guidelines could not be applied retroactively to extinguish Shepard’s preexisting court-awarded continuing medical prescriptions; it vacated the trial order and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 326(G) / incorporated ODG/OTG can be applied to reduce or eliminate a continuing medical award already made before § 326(G)’s effective date | Shepard: retroactive application unconstitutionally diminishes accrued substantive right to continuing medical care (prescriptions) fixed at injury/award | Respondents: § 326(G) governs scope/duration of medical benefits; Guidelines are prospective rules of evidence/procedure and reflect current legislative will | Held: § 326(G) and Guidelines were applied retroactively to Shepard’s award and that application unconstitutionally diminished her accrued substantive right; vacated and remanded |
| Whether § 326(G) merely changes procedure/burden or alters substantive rights | Shepard: it changes substantive entitlement by creating a presumption that treatment outside Guidelines is not reasonable and restricts treating physician testimony | Respondents: it only directs how the benefit is provided (procedural/evidentiary) | Held: change was substantive because it removed liability for prescriptions previously awarded, not a mere procedural rule |
| Whether independent medical examiner reports under § 326(G) may supplant treating physician evidence | Shepard: § 326(G) improperly limits evidentiary proof to independent examiners for treatments outside Guidelines | Respondents: statute and Guidelines validly set presumptions and procedures for proving necessity | Held: Court invalidated retroactive application here; did not need to fully resolve broader evidentiary preclusion claim but recognized constitutional limits on altering burden of proof for existing awards |
| Remedy when trial tribunal relies on flawed or inapplicable evidence (Dr. Y.'s report) | Shepard: trial relied on a report applying Guidelines that should not govern her award | Respondents: sought order enforcing Guidelines compliance | Held: vacated order and remanded for new hearing; respondents may submit compliant medical evidence under controlling law on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Iwunoh v. Maremont Corp., 692 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1984) (continuing medical treatment is a fact question for the tribunal and crucial to rehabilitation)
- Orrick Stone Co. v. Jeffries, 488 P.2d 1243 (Okla. 1971) (award of continuing medical treatment may be made as part of disability finding)
- Knott v. Halliburton Services, 752 P.2d 812 (Okla. 1988) (statutes in force at time of injury form part of the employment "contract")
- Hillcrest Med. Ctr. v. Powell, 295 P.3d 13 (Okla. 2013) (statutory retroactivity analysis; independent medical examiner provision held retroactive where Legislature so intended)
- American Airlines v. Crabb, 221 P.3d 1289 (Okla. 2009) (retroactive amendments cannot affect substantive rights fixed at date of injury)
- Broken Arrow Nursing Home v. Huff, 28 P.3d 568 (Okla. 2001) (when evidence is flawed on appeal, appellate courts remand for a new hearing to afford replacement admissible evidence)