212 So. 3d 603
La. Ct. App.2017Background
- Dr. Phillip Shelton sued to nullify a change of beneficiary on his deceased wife’s life insurance policy, alleging forgery and undue influence favoring Nancy Pavón.
- Pavón answered and filed a reconventional demand alleging Dr. Shelton’s petition was defamatory and seeking damages.
- Dr. Shelton filed a special motion to strike under La. C.C.P. art. 971 (Louisiana’s Anti‑SLAPP statute); the trial court granted the motion and awarded Shelton attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party.
- Pavón sought a new trial (denied); the trial court attempted to designate the order final, and Pavón appealed.
- The appellate court converted the appeal to a writ because the judgment was not a proper final appealable judgment and reviewed the special motion to strike de novo.
- The court concluded Shelton’s petition involved a private dispute (not a ‘‘public issue’’) and reversed the trial court; it remanded to award attorney fees and costs to Pavón as the prevailing party under Art. 971(B).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Shelton) | Defendant's Argument (Pavón) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether La. C.C.P. art. 971 applies to Shelton’s petition | Shelton: pleadings are written statements made before a judicial proceeding and fall within Art. 971(F)(1)(a) so a special motion to strike is proper | Pavón: Shelton’s petition concerns a private dispute, not a public issue; Art. 971 does not apply | Held: Art. 971 applies only when the speech is in connection with a public issue; Shelton’s petition is private and Art. 971 does not apply |
| Whether the trial court properly shifted burden and evaluated probability of success | Shelton: having met the initial definitional threshold, burden shifted and Pavón cannot show probability of success on defamation | Pavón: trial court misapplied the statute’s definitional clause; no burden shift because Art. 971 inapplicable | Held: Trial court erred at the threshold stage; no need to reach probability of success because Art. 971’s threshold not met |
| Proper remedy for defamatory pleadings in private disputes | Shelton: special motion to strike is appropriate under Art. 971 for statements made in judicial pleadings | Pavón: defamation in private litigation should be addressed by ordinary remedies (e.g., summary judgment), not Anti‑SLAPP | Held: Anti‑SLAPP remedy is limited to public‑issue speech; ordinary defenses/privileges and summary‑judgment procedures remain appropriate for private disputes |
| Entitlement to attorney fees on appeal/remand | Shelton: trial court awarded him fees as prevailing party on motion to strike | Pavón: as prevailing party on appeal/writ, she is entitled to fees under Art. 971(B) | Held: Pavón is the prevailing party; appellate court reverses and remands for trial court to determine reasonable attorney fees and costs in Pavón’s favor (concurring justice would remand to let trial court decide but concurs that Pavón is entitled) |
Key Cases Cited
- Yount v. Handshoe, 171 So.3d 381 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (interpreting Art. 971 narrowly to require connection to a public issue)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (test for whether speech is a matter of public concern: consider content, form, and context)
- Delta Chemical Corp. v. Lynch, 979 So.2d 579 (La. App. 4 Cir.) (discussion of who may move under Art. 971 and attorney‑fee considerations)
- Carroll (In re Succession of Carroll), 72 So.3d 384 (La. App. 2 Cir.) (contrasting authority that treated judicial pleadings as covered by Art. 971 without public‑issue analysis)
- Williams v. New Orleans Ernest N. Morial Convention Ctr., 92 So.3d 572 (La. App. 4 Cir.) (example of private dispute where Art. 971 did not apply)