Shelby County v. Holder
133 S. Ct. 2612
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- The Voting Rights Act of 1965 introduced §5 preclearance (federal approval before certain jurisdictions could change voting laws) and §4(b)’s coverage formula (identifying jurisdictions subject to preclearance) as extraordinary, temporary measures to combat pervasive racial discrimination in voting.
- Congress repeatedly reauthorized the Act (1970, 1975, 1982, 2006), leaving the §4(b) coverage formula unchanged and expanding §5’s scope in 2006; Congress compiled an extensive legislative record when it reauthorized in 2006.
- Shelby County, Alabama (a political subdivision in a §4(b) covered State) brought a facial constitutional challenge to §§4(b) and 5, arguing the preclearance regime and the coverage formula are unconstitutional under current conditions.
- Lower courts (D.D.C. and D.C. Cir.) upheld the reauthorization, finding the congressional record supported continued need for preclearance; one D.C. Cir. judge dissented, arguing the formula no longer rationally identified jurisdictions with worse voting discrimination.
- The Supreme Court held §4(b)’s coverage formula unconstitutional because it is based on decades‑old data and practices and therefore fails the requirement that disparate treatment of States be justified by current conditions; the Court did not rule on §5’s constitutionality and left §2 intact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of §4(b) coverage formula | Shelby: formula is outdated, based on 40-year-old data/practices and thus irrational to single out jurisdictions | Government: Congress reasonably reauthorized based on voluminous record showing continued need; history and deterrence matter | §4(b) unconstitutional — disparate coverage must be justified by current conditions; the 1960s/70s metrics are stale |
| Validity of §5 preclearance (facial challenge) | Shelby: §5’s intrusion on state sovereignty and unequal treatment of States is unjustified today | Government: §5 remains necessary to prevent backsliding and deter discriminatory changes; Congress may use rational means to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment | Court did not decide §5’s constitutionality; left open (some Justices concurred they would invalidate §5) |
| Standard of review and equal‑sovereignty principle | Shelby: unequal treatment of States demands contemporary justification and close review | Government/dissent: Congress’ enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment warrants deference; historical record and reauthorization record suffice | Court applied principle that extraordinary, disparate legislation requires current justification tied to present conditions; equal sovereignty is salient |
| Scope of judicial review over congressional reauthorization | Shelby: courts should ensure coverage remains tied to present conditions (facial relief appropriate) | Government/dissent: reauthorization should be reviewed with deference, especially given legislative record and bail‑out mechanisms; facial challenges are disfavored | Court entertained a facial challenge to §4(b) and struck it down, criticizing Congress for reenacting the old formula without updating it |
Key Cases Cited
- South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the VRA as an extraordinary but justified response to pervasive voting discrimination)
- Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (expressing serious constitutional doubts about §5 and emphasizing that current burdens must be justified by current needs)
- City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding reauthorization and considering DOJ objection data in evaluating §5)
- Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (discussing scope of §5 and its federalism costs)
- Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (analyzing §5 preclearance in the redistricting context)
- McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (articulating the McCulloch rationality/appropriate-means framework cited in congressional‑power context)
