941 F.3d 1022
11th Cir.2019Background
- Sheena Yarbrough was a Section 8 participant whose HUD-required family obligations prohibited drug-related criminal activity.
- In Sept. 2012 Yarbrough was arrested for selling Xanax and Lortab to an undercover informant and was later indicted (Apr. 2013); the criminal charges remained pending.
- The Decatur Housing Authority held informal hearings (including Nov. 2015) and the hearing officer relied on grand-jury indictments, arrest records, staff testimony, and Yarbrough’s own admissions to find she engaged in drug-related criminal activity and to terminate her voucher.
- Yarbrough sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Authority violated a HUD regulation requiring decisions be based on a preponderance of the evidence and that the termination violated procedural due process by resting on insufficient/unreliable hearsay; the district court granted summary judgment for the Authority.
- A panel reversed (relying on Basco), but the en banc court vacated and held the HUD regulation’s preponderance-of-the-evidence requirement is not enforceable via § 1983 and remanded remaining due-process issues to the panel.
- On remand this panel affirmed summary judgment: applying the Supreme Court’s "some evidence" due-process standard (Superintendent v. Hill), the court held the indictments, arrest records, staff testimony, and Yarbrough’s admissions supplied the required minimal evidentiary support; the court declined to announce a broad rule on hearsay reliability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What due-process evidentiary standard governs voucher terminations? | Yarbrough: termination must be supported by evidence (and she contested sufficiency). | Authority: Hill’s “some evidence” minimal standard applies and was met. | Court: Due process requires "some evidence" (Hill standard). |
| Did the Authority’s evidence suffice to support termination? | Yarbrough: indictments/arrest records and hearsay were insufficient and not probative by the applicable standard. | Authority: indictments, arrest reports, staff testimony, and Yarbrough’s admissions provide some evidence. | Court: Evidence (indictments, records, testimony, admissions) constituted "some evidence;" summary judgment affirmed. |
| Is the HUD regulation’s preponderance-of-the-evidence requirement enforceable via §1983? | Yarbrough: HUD regulation requires preponderance and is enforceable in §1983 suit. | Authority: the regulatory standard is not enforceable through §1983. | En banc Eleventh Circuit: HUD reg. §982.555(e)(6) is not enforceable via §1983 (issue decided earlier and left to panel on remand). |
| Can a termination rest solely on uncorroborated hearsay? | Yarbrough: relying exclusively on hearsay violates due process. | Authority: reliable hearsay (with indicia of reliability and admissions) can satisfy minimal review. | Court: declined broad rule; held the hearsay here was sufficiently reliable (given Yarbrough’s admissions) to supply "some evidence." |
Key Cases Cited
- Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (U.S. 1985) (establishes the constitutional "some evidence" standard for minimal evidentiary review of administrative factfinding)
- United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1927) (due process requires decisions be supported by some evidence)
- Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (U.S. 1957) (state may not exclude when there is no basis for the finding)
- Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (U.S. 1973) (probation revocation must have evidentiary support)
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (U.S. 1974) (additional procedural protections such as notice and written statement of reasons)
- Holley v. Seminole County School Dist., 755 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985) (discusses the minimum quantum of evidence required by due process)
- Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2008) (prior Eleventh Circuit rule on agency burden and prima facie showing; later overruled by en banc court)
- Yarbrough v. Decatur Housing Authority, 931 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (held HUD preponderance regulation not enforceable via §1983 and remanded due-process issues)