2019 CO 32
Colo.2019Background
- In 2008 Brooks applied in water court to change the point of diversion for a Giles Ditch water right to the Davenport Ditch headgate; a statutorily required newspaper "resume notice" was published.
- The published resume repeatedly named the Davenport Ditch (five times, once bold) and described the change of point of diversion, but misidentified the section and range for the Davenport headgate.
- Brooks later moved to amend the application to correct the section/range (a ~100-foot difference); the water court granted the amendment and, finding no one would be injured, declined to require republication.
- Eight years later Sheek sued in water court seeking (1) declaratory relief that the decree was void for insufficient notice; (2) quiet title to a prescriptive access easement and ancillary access rights; (3) trespass; (4) theft/interference with a water right; and (5) an injunction.
- The water court granted summary judgment for Brooks on the notice claim (finding the resume sufficient) and dismissed the other claims (deeming some moot and dismissing others for lack of ancillary jurisdiction).
- The Supreme Court affirmed that the resume notice was sufficient, and held that, because the change decree was valid, the remaining claims should have been dismissed for lack of subject-matter (ancillary) jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the published resume notice sufficient to vest water-court jurisdiction? | Sheek: misidentification of section/range made notice insufficient and substituted service failed. | Brooks: resume repeatedly identified Davenport Ditch and change of point of diversion; error was minor and amendment cured it. | Resume notice was sufficient to put interested parties on inquiry notice. |
| Did the water court need republication after the location amendment? | Sheek: republication required because correction moved the claimed right to a different quarter section. | Brooks: amendment was minor; water court properly found no injury and republication unnecessary. | Water court reasonably declined republication because inquiry-notice standard was met. |
| Were trespass and injunction claims justiciable in water court after decree? | Sheek: these claims relate to use and access tied to ditch operations and could be adjudicated in water court. | Brooks: decree validated right to use Davenport Ditch; such claims are moot or subsumed. | Water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over these non-water matters; they should have been dismissed (not adjudicated as moot). |
| Were the prescriptive-easement and theft/interference claims within water-court ancillary jurisdiction? | Sheek: claims directly affect water use and thus fall within water-court jurisdiction. | Brooks: these are real-property/tort claims tangential to the water matter and belong in district court. | Court held these claims were outside water-court ancillary jurisdiction and must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Water Rights of Columbine Ass’n, 993 P.2d 483 (Colo. 2000) (resume notice vests subject-matter jurisdiction in water court)
- Monaghan Farms, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 807 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1991) (resume must put interested parties on inquiry notice of nature, scope, impact)
- Closed Basin Landowners Ass’n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734 P.2d 627 (Colo. 1987) (misidentification of exact well locations does not necessarily defeat notice)
- City of Black Hawk v. City of Central, 97 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004) (defective notice occurs when material information is absent; discrepancies can be immaterial)
- City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation, 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996) (analysis of when location discrepancies render notice inadequate)
- Crystal Lakes Water & Sewer Ass’n v. Backlund, 908 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1996) (water court has ancillary jurisdiction only over matters that directly affect water outcomes)
- FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. Colo. Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1990) (water court should not decide underlying real property issues only tangentially related to water matters)