Sheehan v. Town of Carver,Ma
1:24-cv-12347
| D. Mass. | May 7, 2025Background
- Plaintiff Margaret Sheehan is an environmental attorney who led multi-year opposition to commercial sand mining/hauling in Plymouth and Carver, MA, and formed Save the Pine Barrens, Inc. to challenge mining permits and related actions.
- She alleges towns and town officials (Municipal Defendants) protected mining interests and engaged in an unwritten policy to impede opponents; local companies (Makepeace, SLT) and officers allegedly coordinated with officials to intimidate, harass, and silence her.
- Specific alleged misconduct includes: public berating and cutting-off at zoning/conservation hearings; a threatening hallway encounter; anonymous online smear campaign (“Meg Cost Us Millions”) reposted/amplified by officials and industry actors; security personnel videotaping her; and other disparaging public statements and false postings.
- Claims asserted: violations of First and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy claims under § 1983 and § 1985(3); Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA); defamation (libel/slander); intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); and invasion of privacy (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B).
- Procedural posture: defendants moved to dismiss. Court denied dismissal in part and granted in part on May 7, 2025, taking facts in the complaint as true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.
- Key outcomes at dismissal stage: First Amendment § 1983 claims survived against municipalities and certain individual officials; Fourteenth Amendment substantive due‑process claims dismissed; § 1985(3) conspiracy claims dismissed; select defamation, MCRA, and IIED claims against private-industry defendants survived; privacy claim dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sheehan engaged in protected First Amendment activity and whether defendants’ conduct amounted to actionable chilling/retaliation | Sheehan: her advocacy before town boards on sand‑mining is protected speech/attorney advocacy and the repeated harassment would chill an ordinary person | Municipal Defs: actions were criticism or de minimis and she was not deterred (she continued litigation) | Court: speech is protected; allegations plausibly show conduct that would chill a person of ordinary firmness; First Amendment § 1983 claims survive against municipalities and certain officials |
| Municipal (Monell) liability for unwritten custom/policy to protect mining interests | Sheehan: towns had an unwritten custom protecting miners and impeding opponents; evidence of patterned conduct supports custom | Towns: allegations are conclusory and lack causal link between any municipal custom and violations | Court: complaint alleges multiple instances and systemic pattern sufficient at pleading stage to infer an unlawful municipal custom; Monell claims survive |
| Legislative / quasi‑judicial absolute immunity for town officials presiding over boards | Municipal Defs: actions were official legislative or quasi‑judicial acts entitled to absolute immunity | Plaintiff: conduct (selective treatment, preventing testimony, personal attacks) was administrative/bias and not protected | Court: immunity not resolved for dismissal—allegations show administrative, non‑protected behavior; officials not entitled to absolute immunity at this stage |
| Conspiracy liability under § 1983 and § 1985(3) against private industry actors (Makepeace, SLT) and municipal actors | Sheehan: private companies conspired with municipal actors to deprive her of rights; factual allegations show agreements and coordinated acts | Defs: plaintiff alleges only shared interest or isolated incidents, not an agreement; § 1985 requires class‑based animus | Court: § 1983 conspiracy pled with sufficient factual detail to survive against Makepeace and SLT; § 1985(3) dismissed because Sheehan did not allege class‑based, invidious animus |
| Defamation—whether statements are actionable (opinion/fact), whether Sheehan is limited‑purpose public figure, and whether company liability attaches | Sheehan: many false statements/posts and reposts injured reputation; company principals’ statements impute to corporate defendants | Defs: many assertions are non‑actionable opinion; plaintiff is a public figure requiring actual malice; statements by individuals not attributable to company | Court: some defamation claims survive: claims against municipal officials in their individual capacities and against SLT/Opachinski survive; Makepeace/Kane defamation dismissed for the challenged 2021 statement (not about plaintiff) and some earlier statements deemed time‑barred; limited‑purpose public‑figure status and malice are fact issues not resolved now |
| IIED and Massachusetts Privacy Act claims | Sheehan: repeated harassment, videotaping, doxxing and grotesque photos caused severe emotional distress and invaded privacy | Defs: alleged conduct not extreme/or invasions are not of intimate private facts; privacy claims require disclosure of intimate facts | Court: IIED claims survive against SLT and Makepeace (patterned harassment may be extreme); IIED and defamation claims against municipalities in official capacities dismissed (MTCA); Massachusetts privacy claim dismissed for failure to plead disclosure of intimate facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87 (1st Cir.) (standard for accepting complaint facts on 12(b)(6))
- Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59 (1st Cir.) (judicial notice and documents incorporated by reference)
- In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.) (consideration of public records on motion to dismiss)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983 requires unconstitutional policy or custom)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard; need plausible agreement for conspiracy)</n* Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard; threadbare recitals insufficient)
- Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (public‑concern speech protection)
- Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (robust protection for speech on public issues)
- Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (attorney advocacy can be First Amendment speech)
- Bogan v. Scott‑Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (legislative immunity for local legislators)
- Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9 (1st Cir.) (campaign of harassment can support First Amendment retaliation claim)
- Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.) (substantive due process conscience‑shocking standard)
- Wadsworth v. Nguyen, 129 F.4th 38 (1st Cir.) (elements for substantive due process claim)