Shedrick Henry v. M. Spearman
899 F.3d 703
9th Cir.2018Background
- Shedrick Henry, a California prisoner, was convicted in 1996 of felony discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling and second-degree murder under California’s second-degree felony-murder rule.
- Henry previously filed and lost a federal habeas petition; he moved for permission to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition based on Johnson v. United States (2015).
- Johnson held the ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague; Welch later made Johnson retroactive on collateral review.
- California’s second-degree felony-murder rule imputes malice when a killing occurs during a non-enumerated felony that is “inherently dangerous,” evaluated abstractly by the elements and using indeterminate standards like “substantial risk” or “high probability.”
- Henry argued Johnson’s reasoning (ordinary-case abstraction + fuzzy risk standard) applies to California’s rule, rendering it void for vagueness; the State raised standing, mootness/harmless-error, and categorical-distinction defenses.
- The Ninth Circuit’s task at this stage was limited: determine whether Henry made a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to file a second or successive petition (a light, permissive gatekeeping standard).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Henry) | Defendant's Argument (California) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Henry may obtain authorization to file a second or successive § 2254 petition relying on Johnson | Johnson announces a new, retroactive rule that plausibly applies to California’s abstract, inherently-dangerous felony-murder rule, so Henry’s claim "relies on" Johnson | Henry lacks standing because his conduct was clearly proscribed pre-Johnson; claim effectively moot via harmless-error; Johnson limited to ACCA residual clause | Granted authorization: Henry made a prima facie showing that his claim relies on Johnson and may file a second/successive petition; merits left to district court |
| Whether Johnson’s vagueness rule extends beyond the ACCA residual clause to California’s rule | Both doctrines employ a judge-imagined ordinary-case abstraction and indeterminate risk standards, so Johnson plausibly extends | Johnson is tied to ACCA textual features (enumerated list, temporal scope, judicial history) absent in California law | Court found it plausible Johnson could extend; not foreclosed on its face |
| Whether Henry has standing to bring a facial vagueness challenge | Facial challenge permitted post-Johnson; Johnson invalidated clause even as to “straightforward cases,” so Henry may challenge statute he was convicted under | Pre-Johnson precedent (Holder, Hoffman Estates, Maynard) suggests no standing when conduct clearly proscribed | Court held Johnson and subsequent precedent (Dimaya) undermine the old restrictions; Henry at least arguably has standing for a facial challenge |
| Whether procedural defenses (mootness, harmless error) bar authorization | Procedural and merits defenses go to district court; § 2244(b) requires only a prima facie showing | State contends harmless-error resolution in state court forecloses relief | Court declined to resolve these defenses at gatekeeping stage; they belong to district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague due to ordinary-case abstraction and indeterminate risk standard)
- Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016) (Johnson announced a new rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applied Johnson’s reasoning to invalidate analogous vagueness in immigration statute; clarified Johnson’s reach)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (facial vagueness limits prior to Johnson)
- Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (standing and vagueness principles)
- Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (vagueness and notice principles)
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (AEDPA gatekeeping for second/successive habeas petitions)
- Cooper v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (prima facie showing defined as sufficient to warrant fuller district-court exploration)
- In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2017) (§ 2244(b) requires a permissive, flexible, case-by-case prima facie showing)