Shebri Stacy Dillon v. Commonwealth of Virginia
1375163
| Va. Ct. App. | Oct 10, 2017Background
- On Feb. 24, 2014, Dillon registered a forged deed of gift and paid a recording fee at the Roanoke County Circuit Court clerk’s office, a courthouse office physically located in the City of Salem.
- A jury convicted Dillon of uttering a forged record (among other felonies not at issue here).
- Dillon argued on appeal that venue was improper in Roanoke County because the offense occurred in Salem.
- The trial court held that Roanoke County was a proper venue because the clerk’s office was Roanoke County property and the county had concurrent jurisdiction with Salem.
- The dispositive legal question was whether the “special venue” statute granting concurrent jurisdiction (originally Code § 17-126.2, now codified at Code § 17.1-515.2) remained effective despite codification changes in 1988 and a 1998 recodification of Title 17.
Issues
| Issue | Dillon's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue was proper in Roanoke County for an offense committed at a Roanoke County office located in the City of Salem | Venue was improper; the offense occurred in Salem so prosecution must be in Salem | Roanoke County and Salem have concurrent territorial jurisdiction under the special venue statute, so prosecution in Roanoke County is proper | Court held Roanoke County was proper venue under the special concurrent-jurisdiction statute |
| Whether the 1998 repeal/recodification of Title 17 repealed the special venue statute (Code § 17-126.2) | The 1998 recodification repealed or eliminated the statute, so concurrent jurisdiction no longer existed | The statute remained part of the Acts of Assembly (not repealed); omission from the Code in 1988 was codification practice, not repeal | Court held the statute remained effective as part of the Acts of Assembly and was not repealed by the 1998 recodification |
| Proper interpretive approach to the repeal/recodification clauses | Clauses of the recodification should be read to repeal the non–set out provisions | Repeal clauses must be read to give effect to all provisions; specific repeals show Legislature did not intend to repeal non–set out statutes | Court construed repeal clauses to avoid rendering any clause superfluous and concluded non–set-out provisions survived |
| Whether venue statutes are penal (affecting strict construction) | (Implied) penal construction required in favor of defendant | Venue is not penal; strict construction of penal statutes does not apply to venue provisions | Court noted venue statutes are not penal and did not apply strict penal construction |
Key Cases Cited
- Holland v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 445, 749 S.E.2d 206 (appellate review standard for jurisdiction and statutory interpretation)
- Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 661 S.E.2d 415 (interpretive rule to give effect to all statutory words)
- Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (distinguishing subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction)
- Leone v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 147, 747 S.E.2d 809 (territorial jurisdiction synonymous with venue)
- Garza v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 559, 323 S.E.2d 127 (special venue statute grants concurrent jurisdiction to Roanoke County and Salem)
- Eberhardt v. Fairfax Cty. Emp. Ret. Sys. Bd. of Trs., 283 Va. 190, 721 S.E.2d 524 (Acts of Assembly are the authoritative source; codification choices do not repeal statutes)
- Commonwealth v. Squire, 278 Va. 746, 685 S.E.2d 631 (avoid interpreting statutes to render legislative language superfluous)
- Kirby v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 665, 762 S.E.2d 414 (venue statutes are not penal in nature)