Shea Rebecca Brown v. Rudolph Davis, Sr.
684 F. App'x 928
11th Cir.2017Background
- Shea Brown, a white female LCPD officer (Mar 2008–Aug 2009), was placed on administrative leave after State Attorney charged her with tampering with evidence for destroying misdemeanor marijuana taken from an arrestee.
- The FDLE initially declined to proceed; the State Attorney later filed charges; the criminal case ended in a mistrial and was ultimately dismissed for speedy-trial reasons.
- Interim Chief Carlton Tunsil (and Captain Rudolph Davis) conducted internal affairs (IA) investigations resulting in sustained policy violations; Davis had previously expressed skepticism about women in law enforcement and preferred hiring Greg Williams (an African-American male) who was hired the same day Brown was fired.
- City officials told Tunsil that an officer who was arrested would have to be terminated; Brown was terminated on Aug 31, 2009, with five stated reasons, including that her arrest brought discredit to the agency.
- Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 claiming race- and gender-based wrongful termination; district court granted summary judgment for defendants after finding Brown failed to rebut each nondiscriminatory reason, and this court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown’s arrest was pretext for discrimination | Davis’s 2013 letter and the close connection between the arrest and IA investigations show the arrest was suspicious and pretextual | Arrest alone (a felony arrest) was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for termination and Brown identified no officer arrested and retained | Affirmed: arrest was a legitimate reason; Brown failed to rebut it |
| Whether Davis’s post hoc statements (2013 letter) create a triable issue | Letter shows vindictiveness and contradicts defendants’ reasons | Letter does not contradict the fact of arrest or show final decisionmaker repudiated arrest reason | Affirmed: letter insufficient to show pretext |
| Whether closely related IA investigations undermine the arrest justification (Woodard/Holland theory) | IA investigations were pretextual; because arrest arose from same incident, the arrest should also be suspect | The arrest (the stated ground) is distinct from underlying conduct; plaintiff offered no evidence she would not have been fired for any other arrest reason | Affirmed: no logical nexus shown; plaintiff must rebut each reason individually |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting | Brown contends she established pretext for several reasons and thus survives summary judgment | Defendants produced legitimate reasons; Brown did not show weaknesses so serious a factfinder could disbelieve them all, particularly the arrest reason | Affirmed: Brown failed to rebut each nondiscriminatory reason; summary judgment proper |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
- Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (decisionmaker admissions that directly contradict proffered reason can show pretext)
- Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004) (similar—final decisionmaker statements undermining employer’s explanation support inference of pretext)
- Woodard v. Fanboy, LLC, 298 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2002) (when one proffered reason is directly rebutted, related reasons may become suspect)
- Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047 (11th Cir. 2012) (same principle applied where one justification is credibly refuted)
- McMullen v. Carson, 568 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (police departments have legitimate interest in terminating officers after felony arrest to preserve public confidence)