Shawna Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A., 19-1380

Lemon joined Myers Bigel (MB) as an associate in 2001 and became an equity partner in 2007 by purchasing equal shares; compensation was tied to firm profits and she had equal voting power on the Board.
As a partner she served on the Management Committee and held officer positions (Vice President and Secretary); the Board later removed references to shareholders as "employees" from the shareholder agreement.
In 2016 MB commissioned an outside investigation into gender discrimination; Lemon sought access to the investigatory memorandum, retained counsel, and relations with other partners deteriorated (including an alleged comment that she “played the black card too much”).
Lemon requested short-term leave (she did not plead medical specifics); the full Board voted 17–3 to deny the request, a process she alleges differed from how white partners’ leave was handled.
Lemon resigned and sued under Title VII (race and gender discrimination and retaliation) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (race discrimination). The district court dismissed the Title VII claim for failure to plead employee status and the § 1981 claim for failure to plead a plausible inference of race-based but-for causation; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an equity partner is an "employee" under Title VII	Lemon: despite partner status she alleged employment-like relations and sought Title VII protections; urged the law accommodate novel circumstances	MB: Lemon was a co-equal owner with voting power, profit/loss share, and governance rights—Clackamas control factors show she is not an employee	Court: Held Lemon is a partner/co-owner, not an employee; Title VII does not cover her claim
Whether Lemon pleaded a plausible § 1981 claim for racial discrimination in denial of leave	Lemon: board process, differential treatment compared to white partners, and the "black card" remark support inference of race-based denial	MB: pleadings lack factual detail on eligibility and fail to show race was the but-for cause of the denial	Court: Dismissed § 1981 claim for failure to plead eligibility and Comcast but-for causation plausibly

Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (adopts common-law control test and non‑exhaustive factors for employee status under Title VII)
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (statutory definition of "employee" analyzed by reference to agency/master‑servant concepts)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must be plausible to survive 12(b)(6))
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applies plausibility standard and requires more than conclusory allegations)
Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (discrimination plaintiff must plead that protected trait was the but‑for cause of the harm)
Thomas v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645 (4th Cir. 2002) (elements for discriminatory denial of employment benefits under § 1981)