Shawn Wilson v. State of Indiana
39 N.E.3d 705
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- On Jan 31, 2014, pizza driver Daniel Jaffke was shot once and his black Jeep stolen from an apartment complex; the .32 slug was recovered at autopsy.
- Later that night Shawn Wilson appeared at his stepmother’s home saying he had “just shot a man on the southside,” patted his waistband where a handgun butt was visible, and appeared distraught.
- Jaffke’s Jeep was found near the stepmother’s home; Wilson’s left thumbprint was found on an insurance card inside the Jeep.
- Witness Workman testified about Wilson’s statements at the stepmother’s home; Wilson sought to cross-examine Workman about deposition statements minimizing Workman’s prior arrests but was prohibited from doing so.
- Defense sought to admit via Lisa Davis testimony out-of-court statements by Brown and Amanda Ball (implicating Brown and asserting disposal of the weapon) as statements against penal interest; the trial court excluded them for lack of proof of declarant unavailability under Evid. R. 804.
- A jury convicted Wilson of murder, felony murder, robbery (Class A, later reduced for sentencing), and carrying a handgun without a license; the court merged felony murder into murder, reduced robbery to a Class C for sentencing, imposed a 5-year firearm enhancement, and sentenced Wilson to 65 years total. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Wilson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of cross-examination about Workman’s deposition understatement of prior arrests | Not material to bias or credibility under Rules 607, 616, 608(b); extrinsic evidence of specific acts not admissible | Excluding the cross-examination violated Sixth Amendment confrontation/cross-examination rights and bore on witness credibility | Trial court did not abuse discretion or violate Confrontation; exclusion proper under evidence rules; any error harmless |
| Admissibility of Davis’s testimony recounting Brown/Ball statements as statements against penal interest (Evid. R. 804(b)(3)) | Excluded: defense failed to show declarants were unavailable as required by Rule 804(a) | Statements were admissible under the statement-against-interest exception and necessary to show third-party culpability | Exclusion was proper because defendant did not demonstrate unavailability; double-hearsay aspects also problematic; any constitutional error harmless |
| Sufficiency of evidence to support convictions for murder, robbery, and carrying handgun without license | Evidence (Wilson’s admissions, visible gun, fingerprint in Jeep, Jeep located nearby) supports convictions beyond a reasonable doubt | Evidence insufficient to prove Wilson knowingly killed Jaffke, committed robbery, or carried a real handgun | Evidence sufficient: reasonable inferences supported murder, robbery, and handgun-without-license convictions |
| Sentencing: merger of felony murder and sentencing order ambiguities (robbery class; firearm enhancement) | Trial court properly merged felony murder into murder; firearm enhancement applied as 5-year enhancement to murder; sentencing order wording contained scrivener’s error but intent clear | Argued merger/vacatur error and conflicts between oral and written orders created ambiguity/double jeopardy risk | No double jeopardy: felony-murder count merged (no judgment entered); robbery reduced for sentencing as discussed; firearm enhancement treated as enhancement (scrivener’s error in form only) |
Key Cases Cited
- Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559 (Ind. 2014) (standard for appellate review of evidentiary rulings)
- Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 2000) (discussing hearsay exceptions and Rule 804)
- Jervis v. State, 679 N.E.2d 875 (Ind. 1997) (interpretation of statements against penal interest)
- Laux v. State, 821 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2005) (merger and double jeopardy principles regarding multiple convictions)
- Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2006) (discussion on merger vs. vacatur and double jeopardy)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (limits on cross-examination under Confrontation Clause)