Shawn Martin v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
699 F. App'x 866
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Shawn Martin pled guilty in Florida to multiple child-sex offenses and received 48 months’ imprisonment plus 10 years’ sex-offender probation as part of a plea agreement; without the plea his guideline exposure was much higher.
- In April 2005 the State alleged four probation violations (traveling out of county without permission, detours from commute, untruthful answers about driving, and failure to maintain a driving log); Martin admitted the violations at a revocation hearing and offered explanations.
- Martin’s counsel (Rick Terrana) argued to the state court that the violations were not "willful and substantial," but the court revoked probation and imposed a 35-year sentence.
- Martin pursued state postconviction review (Rule 3.850), asserting Terrana misadvised him about sentencing, failed to advise him of the State’s burden to prove violations were willful and substantial, and pressured him to admit; the state courts credited Terrana’s testimony that the admissions were a strategic decision and denied relief.
- Martin filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition claiming ineffective assistance under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; the district court denied relief (also noting a circuit precedent that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee counsel at probation-revocation proceedings), and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Martin of the State’s burden to prove violations were "willful and substantial" | Terrana never informed Martin of that burden; without it Martin could not make a knowing, voluntary decision to admit | Terrana warned of sentencing exposure, discussed strategy to admit to avoid harsh sentence, and argued the willful-and-substantial point to the judge; his conduct was strategic | Court held state-court finding that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient was reasonable, so no Strickland violation |
| Whether any deficient performance prejudiced Martin (Strickland prejudice) | Had Martin known the burden, he would not have admitted and might have contested revocation | Terrana advised Martin of the risk of an 80-year sentence if he litigated and lost; given that risk, admitting was a reasonable strategy and Martin likely would not have risked a hearing | Court held state court reasonably found no prejudice — Martin failed to show a reasonable probability he would have rejected the admitted-strategy and proceeded to a hearing |
| Whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to probation-revocation proceedings (cognizability) | (Raised below) Martin relied on his state-created right to counsel and alleged constitutional ineffective assistance | State argued federal habeas relief is limited because there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at probation revocation (citing circuit precedent) | Court declined to resolve the Sixth Amendment scope because the ineffective-assistance claim fails on the merits; affirmed denial of § 2254 petition |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective assistance test)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference; state-court decisions presumed to have adjudicated federal claims on the merits)
- Jones v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1979) (cited regarding scope of Sixth Amendment right to counsel in probation-revocation context)
- Stewart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for factual findings and mixed questions on § 2254)
- Diaz v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 402 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2005) (deference framework for federal issues decided by state courts)
- Gilbert v. State, 913 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Florida law: probation may be revoked only for willful and substantial violations)