Shawn Ezell v. Kansas City Southern Rwy Co., 866 F.3d 294

On July 12, 2011 a Kansas City Southern Railway (KCSR) train stopped in West Point, MS to perform switching and blocked three public crossings for about 24 minutes (per plaintiff’s expert).
Shawn Ezell approached one blocked crossing at night in foggy/dark conditions, testified he didn’t recall seeing warning signs, and collided with a stationary black railcar; he suffered catastrophic injuries.
Ezell sued in Mississippi state court asserting negligence claims: (1) negligence per se under Mississippi’s Anti‑Blocking Statute (max 5 minutes); (2) negligence based on violation of KCSR’s internal rule (avoid blocking >10 minutes when practical); and (3) failure to adequately warn motorists of the occupied crossing.
KCSR removed the case to federal court, arguing the ICCTA completely preempted the blocking claims, and moved for summary judgment on all claims; the district court granted summary judgment for KCSR.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed: it held both blocking claims preempted by the ICCTA and the failure‑to‑warn claim barred by Mississippi’s Occupied Crossing Rule (no unusual/peculiar conditions shown).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ezell’s negligence‑per‑se claim under Mississippi’s Anti‑Blocking Statute is preempted by ICCTA	Ezell contends state statute imposes enforceable limits on crossing occupancy and supports negligence‑per‑se	KCSR contends ICCTA §10501(b) exclusively governs train operations and displaces state regulation of crossing occupancy	The claim is completely preempted by the ICCTA; removal and dismissal proper
Whether a common‑law negligence claim based on KCSR’s internal operating rule is preempted by ICCTA	Ezell argues violation of KCSR rule supports negligence liability (not displaced)	KCSR argues allowing liability based on switching/occupancy decisions would regulate economic/operational aspects of railroading preempted by ICCTA	Preempted — such claims would regulate/affect train operations and economic decisions and are barred by ICCTA
Whether Ezell’s failure‑to‑warn claim survives despite occupied crossing	Ezell argues darkness, fog, road dip/incline, black car, and sight of a distant light made the crossing unusually dangerous so railroad should have provided warnings	KCSR argues Mississippi’s Occupied Crossing Rule generally bars failure‑to‑warn claims absent peculiar/unusual conditions that make the train not reasonably visible	Occupied Crossing Rule applies; plaintiff failed to show the narrow “peculiar” or “unusually dangerous” exception, so claim barred

Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2001) (ICCTA preemption bars state regulation of train operations such as crossing occupancy)
Elam v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (state negligence claims based solely on blocking time are completely preempted by ICCTA)
Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2010) (§10501(b) preempts laws that manage or govern rail transportation)
Robinson v. Orient Marine Co., 505 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for summary judgment)
King v. Illinois Central R.R., 337 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing Mississippi’s Occupied Crossing Rule and narrow exception for peculiar/unusual conditions)
Owens v. International Paper Co., 528 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining exception to Occupied Crossing Rule when railroad should foresee that motorists may not see the train)