Shawn Ashley v. City of San Antonio, 5:17-cv-00076

Plaintiff Shawn Ashley, a San Antonio Fire Department lieutenant, alleges his cancer diagnosis was disclosed by supervisors/colleagues after he provided the diagnosis to supervisors while completing a First Report of Injury (FRI) to pursue workers’ compensation.
Ashley claims the disclosure (by Assistant Chief Jimenez at meetings about firefighter cancer) violated Section 102(d) of the ADA by revealing confidential medical information and caused emotional injury (including PTSD).
Defendants (City of San Antonio and Chief Charles Hood, in his official capacity) moved for summary judgment, arguing Ashley’s medical condition was not confidential (voluntary disclosure) and that the FRI context is not an ADA-authorized medical inquiry covered by Section 102(d).
The Magistrate Judge reviewed summary judgment evidence (deposition, affidavits, FRI form) and found genuine fact issues on whether Ashley’s information was confidential and whether the disclosure occurred in the course of a Section 102(d) inquiry.
Recommendation: deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment; grant Ashley leave to file a surreply; dismiss defendants’ miscellaneous objections as moot because the report did not rely on the challenged evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ashley's medical information was confidential	Ashley says he kept diagnosis confidential except to family and supervisors to process FRI	Defendants claim Ashley (or wife) voluntarily disclosed diagnosis to coworkers making it non-confidential	Fact question remains; summary judgment denied on this ground
Whether disclosure occurred in course of an ADA-covered medical inquiry (FRI)	Ashley contends he disclosed diagnosis to complete FRI and related employer inquiries are covered by §102(d)	Defendants argue an FRI is not a medical inquiry under §102(d) and thus not protected	Court finds factual and legal dispute; holds a reasonable juror could find FRI-related inquiries fall within §102(d); summary judgment inappropriate
Whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment overall	Ashley: evidence (affidavits, deposition) creates triable issues on confidentiality and covered inquiry	Defendants: contend absence of essential elements of §102(d) claim warrants judgment as a matter of law	Recommendation: deny summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist
Motions re: filings and objections	Ashley sought leave to file a surreply; he opposed defenses’ evidentiary objections	Defendants moved to strike or object to some evidence	Court granted leave to file surreply and dismissed defendants’ objections as moot (did not rely on challenged evidence)

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (genuine-issue standard at summary judgment)
Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., 317 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir.) (FMLA form/inquiry treated as employer inquiry into ability to work)
E.E.O.C. v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir.) (§102(d) does not protect voluntary disclosures outside covered medical inquiry)
Franklin v. City of Slidell, 936 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. La.) (outlines elements of a §102(d) claim)
Ross v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Centers, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Ark.) (contrast: held time-off disclosure not covered by §102(d))
Lechuga v. So. Pac. Transp. Co., 949 F.2d 790 (affidavits with conclusory statements are insufficient at summary judgment)