221 A.3d 112
Me.2019Background
- Grant owns three contiguous lots (including 24 Hulin Rd.) in Belgrade’s Shoreland Zone (Limited Commercial District); combined lots at issue total ~25,000 sq ft with 200 ft shore frontage and contain a rented residence.
- In 2008 Grant obtained a home-occupation permit for Brightside Boat Services at 21 Hulin Rd. (boat cleaning/painting/varnishing); he later installed docks at 24 Hulin Rd. and for ~10 years rented slips and small watercraft to customers who launch from 24.
- In 2018 Grant applied to the Planning Board for seasonal dock and boat-rental permits under the Town’s CDRO and SZO; the Planning Board denied the applications for failing SZO Section 15(A) minimum lot standards.
- Grant appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals (BOA), which held a de novo hearing and concluded Grant’s activities at 24 were commercial, the 2008 home-occupation permit did not cover 24, and nonconforming‑lot provisions did not permit a change to a use that would make the lots more nonconforming.
- The Superior Court (M.R. Civ. P. 80B review) affirmed the BOA; Grant appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of 2008 home-occupation permit | Grant: the 2008 permit covered both 21 and 24 Hulin Rd., so current uses are permitted | Town: permit expressly identified 21 Hulin Rd.; listed business activity was limited (cleaning/painting/varnishing) and did not authorize dock/slip rentals at 24 | Held: Permit applied only to 21 Hulin Rd. and did not authorize Grant’s current/proposed activities at 24 |
| Authority to regulate docks / characterization of activity as commercial | Grant: town lacks authority to regulate docks (or his dock activity is not a new commercial use) | Town: SZO contains definitions (e.g., "marina") and landings/dock-related customer activity constitutes commercial use subject to zoning | Held: BOA reasonably classified Grant’s use as commercial and had authority to regulate the activities at 24 Hulin Rd. |
| Interpretation of nonconforming-lot provisions and change of use | Grant: SZO §12(E)(1) (nonconforming lots may be "built on") exempts legally nonconforming lots from dimensional requirements, allowing change to commercial use | Town: §11 and §12(A) (and MLSO §4) prohibit changes that make a nonconforming lot more nonconforming; §12(E)(1) must be read in context and does not permit changes that increase nonconformity | Held: BOA correctly read ordinances together; change from residential to commercial would make the lots more nonconforming (need larger area/frontage) and is prohibited; both SZO and MLSO apply concurrently |
Key Cases Cited
- Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg, 868 A.2d 161 (Maine 2005) (standard of review for municipal decisions and when BOA acts de novo)
- Goldman v. Town of Lovell, 592 A.2d 165 (Me. 1991) (characterization of ordinance terms as findings of fact when unambiguous)
- Anderson v. Maine Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 985 A.2d 501 (Me. 2009) (standard for setting aside municipal factual findings—record must compel contrary finding)
- Dunlop v. Town of Westport Island, 37 A.3d 300 (Me. 2012) (de novo review of municipal ordinance interpretation is a question of law)
- Forest City, Inc. v. Payson, 239 A.2d 167 (Me. 1968) (zoning ordinances derogate from common law and are strictly construed)
- Day v. Town of Phippsburg, 110 A.3d 645 (Me. 2015) (purpose of grandfathering and balancing municipal abolition of nonconformities with owners’ expectations)
- Wolfram v. Town of North Haven, 163 A.3d 835 (Me. 2017) (zoning provisions that restrict nonconformities are liberally construed; provisions allowing nonconformities are strictly construed)