Background - TransPerfect is a Delaware corporation; co-founders Shawe and Elting were the principal shareholders and board members. Elting sought appointment of a custodian under 8 Del. C. § 226(a); the Chancery Court appointed a custodian and directed a court-supervised sale over the Shawes’ objections. - The Chancery Court issued a Merits Opinion, Custodian Order, Letter Opinion adopting a plan of sale, and a Sale Order; the Shawes’ objections and motion for interlocutory review were denied or overruled. - The Delaware Supreme Court granted interlocutory review and held the Shawes waived their federal constitutional Takings and Due Process arguments for failure to raise them in the trial court; one justice dissented but did not reach the constitutional issue. - After state-court proceedings concluded unfavorably to the Shawes, they filed a § 1983 suit in federal court seeking declaratory relief that the court-ordered sale violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction blocking implementation of the sale. - Defendants (the court-appointed Custodian and Delaware Secretary of State) moved to dismiss on multiple grounds; the federal court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---:|---:| | Whether Rooker–Feldman bars federal review | Shawe: federal constitutional Takings and Due Process claims are independent and reviewable in federal court | Defendants: federal suit is an impermissible appeal of adverse state-court judgments and is barred by Rooker–Feldman | Court: barred — Rooker–Feldman deprives jurisdiction under either test applied | | Applicable Rooker–Feldman test | Shawe: not addressed directly; argued claims independent | Defendants: apply Third Circuit tests (inextricably intertwined or Great Western four-part test) | Court: applied both tests (due to Third Circuit inconsistency) and found both support dismissal | | Whether interlocutory/nonfinal state orders preclude Rooker–Feldman | Shawe: Rooker–Feldman limited to final judgments | Defendants: Rooker–Feldman can apply to interlocutory orders when federal suit seeks review of adverse state rulings | Court: Rooker–Feldman may apply to interlocutory orders; critical point is filing after adverse state rulings — doctrine applies here | | Whether the federal claims are "as-applied" (barred) or independent | Shawe: presents constitutional challenge to statute/condemnation | Defendants: claims attack the state court’s application of state law to plaintiffs and therefore are as-applied challenges barred by Rooker–Feldman | Court: claims are as-applied challenges seeking rejection of state judgments and are barred | ### Key Cases Cited Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (clarified limits of federal review of state-court judgments under Rooker–Feldman) Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2010) (articulated four-part test for Rooker–Feldman application) In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 2005) (explained the inextricably intertwined formulation of Rooker–Feldman) Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2000) (held Rooker–Feldman can apply to interlocutory orders) * Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2017) (discussed precedential effect of panel decisions and en banc considerations)