Shaw v. Wizards of the Coast, LLC, 5:16-cv-01924

Background

Plaintiffs are certified "Judges" for Wizards of the Coast's Magic: the Gathering Events and sue under the FLSA and California law, alleging Judges perform work for Wizards but are treated as volunteers and unpaid.
Plaintiffs sought conditional (notice-stage) collective-action certification under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for all Judges at sanctioned Events from April 12, 2013 onward.
Plaintiffs submitted declarations describing certification, duties, training, and alleged control by Wizards; Wizards submitted declarations and documentary evidence showing varied event structures, multiple staffing arrangements, and some paid independent-contractor agreements.
Wizards showed that most sanctioned Events are run and staffed by stores or third-party tournament organizers, which set staffing and compensation; Wizards directly runs only a few events and for some head Judges used written independent-contractor agreements.
The Judge program materials describe membership as "voluntary," but the court found Plaintiffs’ declarations conclusory and insufficient to show a single, company-wide policy refusing compensation.
Court denied conditional certification, concluding plaintiffs failed to show they and putative class members were victims of a single decision, policy, or plan and that adjudication would require individualized inquiries across thousands of events.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the case should be conditionally certified as an FLSA collective	Judges are similarly situated victims of a common policy treating them as volunteers and withholding wages	No uniform policy; compensation and engagement vary by event, store, and tournament organizer; some Judges were paid	Denied — plaintiffs failed to show a single decision, policy, or plan affecting all putative members
Whether Plaintiffs showed a common plan/policy to classify Judges as volunteers	Judge program materials and Plaintiffs’ declarations show uniform training, rules, and statements calling judging "volunteer" work	Corporate and event-specific evidence shows multiple staffing/compensation arrangements and written contractor agreements for some Judges	Court: Program materials alone insufficient; evidence shows substantial variation in engagement and compensation
Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ declarations at the notice stage	Declarations describe duties, control, and unpaid work supporting lenient notice-stage standard	Declarations are conclusory, often lack foundation or personal-knowledge detail and do not contradict defendant's evidence of variation	Declarations inadequate to meet plaintiffs’ burden for conditional certification
Whether collective adjudication would promote judicial economy	Plaintiffs: common issues of classification make collective proceedings efficient	Defendant: adjudication would require individualized, plaintiff-by-plaintiff inquiry across many events and organizers	Court: Individualized inquiries would predominate; collective action is not appropriate

Key Cases Cited

Leuthold v. Destination America, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing two-step collective certification approach and standard at notice stage)
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001) (notice-stage requires substantial allegations that putative members were victims of a single decision, policy, or plan)
Adams v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 530 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (describing the "fairly lenient" conditional-certification standard)
Shaia v. Harvest Mgmt. Sub LLC, 306 F.R.D. 268 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (unsupported allegations insufficient for conditional certification)
Velasquez v. HSBC Fin. Corp., 266 F.R.D. 424 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (evidence beyond conclusory allegations required at notice stage)
Reab v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 623 (D. Colo. 2002) (volunteer-program facts supported conditional certification where terms expressly treated participants as volunteers)