Shaw v. Clipper
1:19-cv-00875
| N.D. Ohio | Jul 16, 2019Background
- Pro se inmate Meco Shaw filed an in forma pauperis § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement at Lorain Correctional Institution of Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-25(D), which he says would force removal of his dreadlocks.
- Shaw alleges he is in joint custody of the BOP and ODRC and expects to be transferred to LCI when his federal sentence ends in May.
- Shaw contends application of § 5120-9-25(D) to him would violate his rights and requests a declaration and injunction forbidding cutting his hair.
- The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and Rule 12(h)(3) for lack of jurisdiction.
- The court found Shaw lacked Article III standing because he had not alleged a concrete, particularized, or imminent injury from enforcement of the hair regulation.
- The court alternatively held that, even if standing existed, binding precedent supports constitutionality of inmate hair-length regulations, so Shaw failed to state a plausible federal claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing — Article III injury | Shaw will be transferred and therefore faces imminent enforcement of § 5120-9-25(D) against his dreadlocks | No explicit factual application yet; defendants argue lack of present injury | Dismissed for lack of standing; Shaw did not allege an actual or certainly impending injury |
| Ripeness / Prematurity | Enforcement is imminent upon transfer, so relief is warranted now | Challenge is premature absent application of the rule | Complaint is premature and fails Article III requirements |
| Failure to state a claim under RLUIPA/Constitution | Regulation would unlawfully force religiously-motivated haircutting | Ohio hair-length rule is permissible regulation of inmates | Alternatively dismissed for failure to state a plausible federal claim; precedents uphold such rules |
| Leave to appeal in forma pauperis | Not addressed beyond desire to appeal | Court must certify appeal good faith status | Court certifies appeal would not be taken in good faith (denies good-faith certification) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.) (standing requires concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III injury-in-fact must be concrete and imminent)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading governs § 1915 screening)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state plausible claim to survive dismissal)
- Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.) (district courts must screen IFP prisoner complaints under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A)
- Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir.) (prison hair-length regulation may be constitutionally applied despite asserted religious beliefs)
