History
  • No items yet
midpage
Shaw v. Clipper
1:19-cv-00875
| N.D. Ohio | Jul 16, 2019
Read the full case

Background

  • Pro se inmate Meco Shaw filed an in forma pauperis § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement at Lorain Correctional Institution of Ohio Admin. Code § 5120-9-25(D), which he says would force removal of his dreadlocks.
  • Shaw alleges he is in joint custody of the BOP and ODRC and expects to be transferred to LCI when his federal sentence ends in May.
  • Shaw contends application of § 5120-9-25(D) to him would violate his rights and requests a declaration and injunction forbidding cutting his hair.
  • The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and Rule 12(h)(3) for lack of jurisdiction.
  • The court found Shaw lacked Article III standing because he had not alleged a concrete, particularized, or imminent injury from enforcement of the hair regulation.
  • The court alternatively held that, even if standing existed, binding precedent supports constitutionality of inmate hair-length regulations, so Shaw failed to state a plausible federal claim.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Standing — Article III injury Shaw will be transferred and therefore faces imminent enforcement of § 5120-9-25(D) against his dreadlocks No explicit factual application yet; defendants argue lack of present injury Dismissed for lack of standing; Shaw did not allege an actual or certainly impending injury
Ripeness / Prematurity Enforcement is imminent upon transfer, so relief is warranted now Challenge is premature absent application of the rule Complaint is premature and fails Article III requirements
Failure to state a claim under RLUIPA/Constitution Regulation would unlawfully force religiously-motivated haircutting Ohio hair-length rule is permissible regulation of inmates Alternatively dismissed for failure to state a plausible federal claim; precedents uphold such rules
Leave to appeal in forma pauperis Not addressed beyond desire to appeal Court must certify appeal good faith status Court certifies appeal would not be taken in good faith (denies good-faith certification)

Key Cases Cited

  • Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.) (standing requires concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury)
  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III injury-in-fact must be concrete and imminent)
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading governs § 1915 screening)
  • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state plausible claim to survive dismissal)
  • Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.) (district courts must screen IFP prisoner complaints under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A)
  • Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir.) (prison hair-length regulation may be constitutionally applied despite asserted religious beliefs)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Shaw v. Clipper
Court Name: District Court, N.D. Ohio
Date Published: Jul 16, 2019
Docket Number: 1:19-cv-00875
Court Abbreviation: N.D. Ohio