Sharpe v. State, 310 Ga. 254

On October 2, 2016 Devonte Coney was fatally shot after a fight outside Flat’s Lounge in Emanuel County; multiple rounds were fired into the club.
David Lee Sharpe was arrested shortly after the shooting at a nearby restaurant where he discarded a Glock .40 and an extended magazine; the gun had been reported stolen months earlier; gunshot-residue swabs from Sharpe were positive.
Surveillance footage from four cameras was reviewed by GBI Special Agent Joshua Alford, who testified identifying an individual wearing clothing matching Sharpe’s as moving between the club and the parking lot and firing toward the club.
An Emanuel County jury acquitted Sharpe of malice murder but convicted him of felony murder, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; sentences included life for felony murder and consecutive and concurrent terms for the other counts.
On appeal Sharpe argued ineffective assistance of counsel for (1) failing to object to Agent Alford’s testimony (expert/identification) and (2) failing to poll the jury (Juror No. 15 later claimed duress). The Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte for theft by receiving.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions except it reversed the theft-by-receiving conviction as legally insufficient because there was no evidence Sharpe knew or should have known the gun was stolen.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Sharpe)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for theft by receiving	Evidence of possession of a stolen gun shortly after the shooting supports theft-by-receiving conviction	No additional evidence of Sharpe’s knowledge that the gun was stolen	Conviction reversed—no proof Sharpe knew or should have known the gun was stolen
Ineffective assistance for failing to object to GBI agent’s video testimony/identification	Trial counsel should have objected because Alford was not qualified as an expert and improperly identified the person in the videos	Counsel reasonably treated Alford’s testimony as non-opinion descriptive testimony and used it strategically to support self-defense and for cross-examination	No deficient performance—decision not to object was reasonable trial strategy; claim rejected
Ineffective assistance for failing to poll the jury after verdict	Counsel should have requested a juror poll because Juror No. 15 later said she rendered her verdict under duress	No authority required counsel to poll and there was no contemporaneous reason to suspect coercion at the time of verdict	No deficient performance—failure to poll not unreasonable; juror testimony about deliberations barred by rule; claim rejected

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: performance and prejudice)
Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349 (reasonableness standard for counsel performance)
Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140 (avoid hindsight in reviewing trial strategy)
Koonce v. State, 305 Ga. 671 (strategic decisions about objections and cross-examination)
State v. Goff, 308 Ga. 330 (strategic choices after investigation are virtually unchallengeable)
Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. 641 (failure to poll claims previously rejected)
Marshall v. State, 285 Ga. 351 (same)
Cartwright v. State, 291 Ga. 498 (purpose of jury polling and coercion concerns)
Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464 (procedure when poll shows nonunanimous verdict)
Chavez v. State, 307 Ga. 804 (standards for assessing counsel’s polling decisions)
Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261 (insufficiency where evidence did not show defendant knew gun was stolen)
Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385 (procedural note about sua sponte sufficiency review ending)
Beck v. State, 305 Ga. 383 (explaining near-categorical bar on juror testimony about deliberations)