Sharp v. State, 133 A.3d 1089

Sharp was charged with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and openly carrying a dangerous weapon arising from a severe beating at a St. Patrick’s Day party; jury convicted him of first-degree assault (and related counts).
On the eve of trial and again the morning trial began, the court described plea offers: State would recommend 25 years with all but 10 suspended; the court offered 20 years with all but 8 suspended (an eight-year cap). Sharp, via counsel, declined and proceeded to trial.
At sentencing the prosecutor sought a substantial upward departure above the guidelines (7–13 years) based on the brutality of the assault and prior record; defense asked the court to impose the court’s prior plea-cap sentence.
During a sentencing colloquy the court and defense counsel debated whether declining a plea and forcing witnesses to testify justified denial of the plea-capped sentence; defense counsel said she did not believe in punishing a defendant for going to trial.
The court ultimately imposed 25 years for first-degree assault (concurrent 3-year weapons count), explaining reasons based on the nature of the injuries and other permissible sentencing considerations.
On appeal Sharp argued the court impermissibly considered his decision not to plead guilty (including that he rejected a court-offer); the Court of Special Appeals affirmed and the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Sharp)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Preservation: whether Sharp preserved objection that court considered his refusal to plead guilty	Sharp contends counsel’s statement (“I don’t believe in punishing someone for wanting to go to trial”) sufficiently objected to the court’s comments	State argued counsel’s remark was a sentencing observation (not an objection) and later acquiescence ("I would agree") waived any objection	Preserved: Court holds counsel’s statement sufficiently made the objection known and was not forfeited by later remarks
Merits: whether record supports inference the court impermissibly considered Sharp’s decision not to plead guilty (including rejecting a court’s plea offer)	Sharp argues the court’s prior “court’s offer” and its remarks could lead a reasonable person to infer the sentence was motivated by punishment for exercising the right to trial	State argues the court’s remarks were responsive to defense argument, explained difference between plea bargains and trial outcomes, and sentencing reasons were otherwise permissible	No error: Court finds the statements, read in context, do not give rise to reasonable inference the court was motivated by impermissible consideration of Sharp’s decision to go to trial

Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536 (court vacated sentence where judge stated defendant would have received lighter sentence if he had pleaded guilty)
Abdul-Maleek v. State, 426 Md. 59 (trial court comments about defendant’s choice to go to trial can create an inference of impermissible consideration requiring resentencing)
Barnes v. State, 70 Md. App. 694 (trial court’s active role in making a plea offer can render a plea involuntary)
Sweetwine v. State, 42 Md. App. 1 (observes norm that lenient plea sentences are departures from the sentencing norm following a full trial)
McGlone v. State, 406 Md. 545 (discusses broad trial court discretion in sentencing and appellate review standard)
Jones v. State, 414 Md. 686 (enumerates three grounds for appellate review of sentence, including impermissible considerations)