Sharp v. Downey
13 A.3d 1
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2010Background
- Nicholas Sharp appeals an Arbitration Award after being left landlocked by the Downeys’ property.
- Two adjacent lots—Lot 2 (Sharp) and Lot 1 (Downey)—were created from a single parcel owned by Ryan in 1996.
- Original Jeep Trail Agreement (1996) and Second Jeep Trail Agreement (1997) purported to establish an ingress/egress easement over Lot 1; the Second Agreement replaced the Original one and limited the easement to Lot 1.
- Health Department Percolation Plan and a Maryland Department of the Environment permit are used to locate the jeep trails; the Health Department Plan depicted the path but did not clearly connect to Morgan Station Road or Lot 2.
- Arbitration began in Jan. 2008; the Award issued Jan. 6, 2009 held the jeep trail did not extend to Morgan Station Road or Lot 2 and rejected an implied easement by necessity.
- The circuit court confirmed the Award in Sept. 2009; Sharp moved to vacate; the court recognized Maryland arbitration policy but ultimately the court denied vacatur.
- On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reverses, vacates Findings 5–7, and remands to determine the precise location of an implied easement by necessity between Lot 2 and Morgan Station Road.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the arbitrator exceeded powers in interpreting the Second Jeep Trail Agreement. | Sharp argues the arbitrator failed to locate the ‘New Road’ shown in the exhibits (the MDE permit) and ignored the plat, effectively exceeding authority. | Downeys assert the arbitrator properly applied the controlling documents (Second Jeep Trail Agreement and Health Department Plan) and did not exceed powers. | Yes; the court finds the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by not locating the disputed ‘New Road’ under the Agreement. |
| Whether an implied easement by necessity exists for Lot 2 to Morgan Station Road. | Sharp contends that, given unity of title and severance, an easement by necessity should be implied to prevent landlocking. | Downeys contend no necessity existed at severance; the express easement did not reach Lot 2 or Morgan Station Road. | Yes; the court holds an implied easement by necessity exists and must be located on remand. |
| Whether the circuit court properly applied the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act standards of vacation/confirmation. | Sharp challenges the court’s denial of vacatur given manifest disregard of law. | Downeys rely on the Act’s narrow grounds for vacatur and for deference to the arbitrator’s factual determinations. | The court recognizes the Act’s limited review but ultimately vacates the challenged findings and remands for location of the implied easement. |
| Should Findings 5–7 be vacated and location resolved on remand? | Sharp seeks vacatur of erroneous Findings to fix easement location. | Downeys oppose vacatur, arguing findings were reasonable. | Yes; the appellate court vacates Findings 5–7 and remands to determine the precise location of the implied easement by necessity. |
Key Cases Cited
- O-S Corp. v. Samuel A. Kroll, Inc., 29 Md.App. 406 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (limits on arbitrator review; ‘completely irrational’ standard for vacation under Md. Act)
- Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2008) (FAA grounds are exclusive; manifest disregard may not be standalone ground under FAA)
- Stansbury v. MDR Dev., L.L.C., 390 Md. 476 (Md. 2006) (prerequisites to easement by necessity; location on remand possible)
- Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317 (Md. 1945) (public policy favoring usable land; necessity doctrine origins)
- Shpak v. Oletsky, 280 Md. 355 (Md. 1977) (necessity concept; deeded right-of-way context; landowner rights)