913 N.W.2d 55
Iowa2018Background
- Decedent Larry Kinseth, a longtime boiler installer, developed mesothelioma after decades of asbestos exposure from installing and occasionally removing boilers and related parts; he sued multiple manufacturers, leaving Weil-McLain as the sole defendant at trial.
- District court granted partial summary judgment applying Iowa’s statute of repose to bar claims based on exposure during removal/tear-out but allowed exposure during installation to proceed.
- Pretrial in limine order barred mention of prior verdicts/lawsuits, defendant’s litigation expenses, wealth/size, and urging the jury to “send a message.”
- After a nearly four‑week trial the jury awarded $4 million compensatory and $2.5 million punitive damages; Weil‑McLain sought a new trial and JNOV, which the district court denied.
- The court of appeals reversed, finding plaintiff’s counsel’s closing arguments violated the in‑limine order and warranted a new trial; Iowa Supreme Court granted further review.
- Supreme Court affirmed that many closing remarks violated the in‑limine order, found the cumulative misconduct prejudicial, and remanded for a new trial with instructions on several evidentiary and allocation issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of mistrial motion | Kinseth argued objections during closing were waived if not contemporaneous | Weil‑McLain argued its post‑rebuttal mistrial motion was timely | Motion was timely because it was made before submission to the jury and the court had opportunity to rule |
| Closing‑argument misconduct (in‑limine violations) | Counsel’s remarks attacked defense experts, raised credibility and admissible themes | Weil‑McLain argued counsel repeatedly referenced defendant’s litigation spending, wealth, prior suits, urged "send a message" and mischaracterized statute of repose | Many statements violated the in‑limine order; cumulative theme was prejudicial; new trial required |
| Judicial estoppel re: compensatory verdict | Kinseth argued defendant’s closing comment that it would "compensate these folks" estopped it from challenging allocation of fault | Weil‑McLain argued comment was not a judicial admission affecting later litigation positions | No judicial acceptance occurred; estoppel inapplicable; defendant may challenge allocation decisions on appeal |
| Inclusion/exclusion of responsible third parties | Kinseth argued some third parties (bankrupt entities) should not be on verdict form; McDonnell & Miller argued valve products caused exposure | Weil‑McLain argued McDonnell & Miller valves and others should be included; defendant argued bankrupts are irrelevant because recovery is minimal | McDonnell & Miller valves properly excluded (insufficient evidence of exposure from their valves during installation); bankrupt entities Hercules and Johns‑Manville properly included because plaintiff had releases/settlements with trusts |
| Admissibility of OSHA and statute‑of‑repose evidence | Kinseth argued OSHA citations and evidence of removal exposures were relevant to causation and punitive damages | Weil‑McLain argued OSHA citations post‑exposure period and removal evidence were irrelevant/unduly prejudicial | OSHA citation for failure to warn admissible for punitive damages; evidence of exposures during removal admissible for causation if properly limited by instruction, despite being noncompensable under repose statute |
| Punitive damages standard (Beeman) | Kinseth argued Weil‑McLain’s failure to warn and conduct justified punitive damages | Weil‑McLain argued Beeman requires showing the defendant’s conduct differed from industry peers | Court clarified Beeman: punitive damages require clear, convincing, satisfactory evidence of willful and wanton conduct by the defendant; conduct may support punitive damages if defendant had specific knowledge and failed to act, even if peers also failed to act |
Key Cases Cited
- Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1970) (timeliness rule for objections to improper closing arguments and when mistrial motions are timely)
- Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1993) (standard for punitive damages in asbestos cases; conduct must set defendant apart or show specific knowledge and willful/wanton conduct)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Hedlund, 740 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 2007) (judicial estoppel principles and policy objectives)
- Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins., 405 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1987) (judicial estoppel requires judicial acceptance to bar inconsistent positions)
- Duder v. Shanks, 689 N.W.2d 214 (Iowa 2004) (judicial estoppel can apply within the same proceeding under proper circumstances)
- Loehr v. Mettille, 806 N.W.2d 270 (Iowa 2011) (new‑trial standard for prejudicial attorney misconduct)