Shari Kinseth and Ricky Kinseth, Co-Executors of the Estate of Larry Kinseth, and Shari Kinseth, Individually, plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants v. Weil-Mclain Company, defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, and State of Iowa, Ex. Rel. Civil Reparations Trust Fund, Intervenor.
15-0943
| Iowa Ct. App. | Apr 19, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Larry Kinseth worked in heating/plumbing from 1957 and was exposed to asbestos from boiler components; he developed mesothelioma and sued multiple manufacturers, including Weil‑McLain; he died during the litigation and his estate continued the suit.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment that claims based on tearing out installed boilers were barred by Iowa’s 15‑year statute of repose, but allowed evidence of such tear‑outs to be admitted for total exposure (with a limiting instruction).
- Before trial, Weil‑McLain obtained motions in limine barring references to corporate wealth, amounts spent defending the litigation, urging the jury to “send a message,” and certain other topics; the court limited use of a 1974 OSHA citation to punitive‑damages/reliance material.
- At trial the jury awarded substantial compensatory damages and $2.5 million punitive damages; Weil‑McLain was assigned 25% fault. Weil‑McLain moved for mistrial based on plaintiffs’ counsel’s closing statements and later appealed after post‑trial motions were denied.
- The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial because the district court abused its discretion in denying Weil‑McLain’s mistrial motions based on repeated violations of the in limine rulings during closing argument; it affirmed evidentiary rulings generally and directed inclusion of McDonnell & Miller on the special verdict form.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs' closing arguments violated in limine rulings and warranted mistrial | Counsel’s remarks were fair argument and permissible commentary on evidence and defendants’ conduct | Counsel repeatedly referenced barred topics (defense spending, corporate wealth, "send a message," other lawsuits, challenged statute of repose), prejudicing the jury | Reversed: district court abused discretion; cumulative and repeated violations made a different result probable, so new trial required |
| Admissibility of 1974 OSHA citation | Citation relevant at least to punitive damages and as reliance material for experts | OSHA citation irrelevant to causation and prejudicial | Affirmed in part: OSHA citation admissible in limited fashion for punitive/ reliance purposes; trial court did not abuse discretion; door may be opened by defendant testimony |
| Admissibility/use of evidence of exposures during tear‑outs despite statute of repose | Tear‑out exposures are relevant to total exposure; limiting instruction prevents unfair prejudice | Tear‑out exposures barred by statute of repose and thus irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial | Affirmed: evidence admissible for total exposure with limiting jury instruction; not more prejudicial than probative |
| Allocation of fault — whether to include certain manufacturers on special verdict form (McDonnell & Miller, Bell & Gossett, Peerless) | Plaintiffs argued only entities with substantial evidence of installation/exposure and viable claims should be listed | Weil‑McLain argued additional companies (including McDonnell & Miller) had substantial evidence of exposure and should be submitted | Mixed: Court held McDonnell & Miller should have been included (evidence of installation and cutting gaskets); Bell & Gossett and Peerless properly excluded because only refurbishing/tear‑out exposure (statute of repose) |
| Punitive damages submission | Plaintiffs presented evidence of delayed warnings and lack of testing to support punitive damages | Weil‑McLain argued punitive damages improper absent clear, convincing evidence distinguishing its conduct from industry peers | Court made no final ruling on punitive damages due to remand for retrial; declined to decide appropriateness on first trial record |
Key Cases Cited
- Heldenbrand v. Exec. Council of Iowa, 218 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1974) (purpose of motion in limine is to avoid prejudicial disclosures that may require mistrial)
- Twyford v. Weber, 220 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa 1974) (violation of in limine may warrant mistrial)
- Mays v. C. Mac Chambers Co., 490 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1992) (party seeking mistrial must show opposing counsel’s conduct was prejudicial)
- Fry v. Blauvelt, 818 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 2012) (trial court has broad discretion on mistrial rulings)
- Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1970) (objections to improper closing remarks must be timely; motion for mistrial before submission is timely)
- Rosenberger Enters., Inc. v. Ins. Serv. Corp., 541 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (discussion of parties’ relative wealth is improper and may require new trial)
- Burke v. Reiter, 42 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1950) (comparisons of earning power or financial condition are improper in assessing damages)
- State v. Parker, 747 N.W.2d 196 (Iowa 2008) (a party may open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence)
- Spaur v. Owens‑Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994) (no allocation of fault to released/ bankrupted party unless plaintiff has a viable claim and settlement/trust procedures addressed)
- Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1993) (punitive damages require evidence that defendant’s conduct was distinct from industry peers)
- Lovick v. Wil‑Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1999) (mere knowledge triggering duty to warn does not satisfy standard for punitive damages)