322 Conn. 191
Conn.2016Background
- Shannon, a long‑time registered sex offender, was admitted to Connecticut’s state rental assistance program in 2009 and received ongoing rental benefits.
- At admission (2009) the Department of Social Services’ administrative plan did not include sex‑offender registration as a ground for termination; the regulation adding that ground (§ 17b‑812‑13(9)) was promulgated in December 2012.
- The Department of Housing (which later assumed administration) terminated Shannon’s assistance in 2013/2014 under § 17b‑812‑13(9) because a household member was subject to sex‑offender registration.
- Shannon administratively appealed, arguing the regulation was being applied retroactively to impose a new obligation and terminate vested benefits; the trial court disagreed and dismissed his appeal.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed whether application of § 17b‑812‑13(9) to a participant admitted before the regulation’s enactment was an impermissible retroactive agency action not authorized by the legislature.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether applying § 17b‑812‑13(9) to terminate benefits of a participant admitted before the rule is retroactive | Shannon: Using preexisting registry status to cut off his continuing benefits attaches a new legal consequence and impairs vested expectations | Housing: Action is prospective — it looks to current status and does not claw back past benefits; program is non‑entitlement subject to agency discretion | Court: Application was retroactive — it imposed a new obligation on Shannon’s preexisting status and interfered with his present right to future benefits; no legislative authorization for retroactive rulemaking |
| Whether Shannon had a vested property interest in continued participation after admission | Shannon: Statute/regulations and administrative plan created a protectable expectancy in ongoing benefits once admitted | Housing: Program is non‑entitlement; benefits always subject to agency discretion and funding limits | Court: Participant who was properly admitted has a present right to future benefits such that termination on basis of preexisting status imposed a new obligation — supports retroactivity finding |
| Proper analytical framework for retroactivity of agency rules | Shannon: Use Landgraf’s functional inquiry (new legal consequences, settled expectations, reliance) — retroactivity found | Housing: Relied on cases (e.g., Bhalerao) holding revocation based on past convictions is prospective because it affects only future conduct and does not undo past benefits | Court: Applies Landgraf; rejects narrow temporal/reliance approach of Bhalerao for continued‑benefit context and finds regulation’s application retroactive |
| Whether legislature authorized retroactive rulemaking for rental program | Shannon: No statutory grant of retroactive rulemaking power | Housing: Did not assert such authorization | Court: No express legislative grant — absent that, agency may not promulgate retroactive rules; reversal required |
Key Cases Cited
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (statute operates retroactively when it attaches new legal consequences to completed events)
- Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (courts reluctant to infer authority for retroactive rulemaking absent clear legislative grant)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (Landgraf retroactivity analysis applies; reliance and settled expectations matter)
- Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (retroactivity inquiry focuses on whether new legal consequences attach to past events)
- Gormley v. State Employees Ret. Comm’n, 216 Conn. 523 (state case applying retroactivity presumption where statute would force choice affecting vested pension rights)
- Bhalerao v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Reg., 834 F. Supp. 2d 775 (N.D. Ill.) (example of contrary approach treating revocation based on past convictions as prospective; discussed and distinguished)