Shaniz West v. City of Caldwell
931 F.3d 978
| 9th Cir. | 2019Background
- Police responded to a 911 call that Shaniz West’s ex‑boyfriend, Fabian Salinas (a gang member with outstanding felony warrants and a history of violence), might be inside West’s home and possibly armed and on methamphetamine.
- Officer Richardson questioned West on the sidewalk; after being told she could be prosecuted for harboring a felon, West said Salinas might be inside, nodded consent to let officers “get inside [her] house and apprehend him,” and gave Richardson a key.
- SWAT was summoned; commanders Seevers and Winfield planned a three‑stage operation: (1) contain and call out the suspect; (2) deploy tear gas to flush him out; (3) enter and search if stages 1–2 failed.
- SWAT fired 12‑gauge rounds to inject tear gas through windows and a garage door, causing substantial property damage and rendering the home uninhabitable for months; after 90 minutes they entered and found no Salinas.
- West sued for unreasonable search/seizure, scope‑of‑consent exceedance, and conversion; district court denied qualified immunity to the officers; the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that, assuming constitutional violations, the law was not clearly established in August 2014.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntariness of consent | West: consent was coerced because Richardson warned she could “get in trouble” and she felt threatened | Richardson: his statement did not amount to coercion; he left and returned; West freely provided key and left the scene | Court: assumed consent invalid but held lack of voluntariness was not clearly established, so Richardson entitled to qualified immunity |
| Scope of consent | West: consent to "get inside and apprehend" did not include launching tear‑gas canisters that destroyed the home | Seevers/Winfield: West gave general consent to enter and arrest; no expressed limitations on manner/place/time; actions aimed at flushing an armed felon | Court: assumed scope exceeded but held no controlling precedent made that unlawfulness clearly established; Seevers/Winfield entitled to qualified immunity |
| Reasonableness of search/damage | West: deploying tear gas as initial means was unreasonable and caused excessive, unnecessary property destruction | Defendants: believed suspect was armed, suicidal, dangerous; tactics conformed to common police practice and aimed to avoid direct confrontation | Court: unreasonableness not clearly established given facts and precedents allowing some property damage during searches; qualified immunity applies |
| Qualified immunity standard | West: defendants violated Fourth Amendment and should be denied immunity | Defendants: even if rights were violated, existing Supreme Court/Ninth Circuit precedent did not place unlawfulness "beyond debate" | Court: assumed violation but reversed denial of qualified immunity because law was not clearly established at the specific level required |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (Sup. Ct. 2018) (clearly‑established inquiry and deference to specific precedent)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (Sup. Ct. 2018) (warning against defining clearly established law at high level of generality)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (objective standard for scope of consent to search)
- Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999) (consent coerced where officer threatened forced entry at the door)
- United States v. Ocheltree, 622 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (consent coerced where agent threatened to obtain warrant, implying detention)
- Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1997) (officers may cause property damage while executing search; mistaken but reasonable belief can support immunity)
- Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (denial of immunity where officers were unnecessarily destructive executing a search)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (district courts may choose order of qualified immunity analysis)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (‘‘obvious’’ cases can overcome need for close precedent)