517 P.3d 1188
Ariz. Ct. App.2022Background:
- In June 2021 Graham County rezoned a parcel (REZ#832-21) to "Unlimited Manufacturing" for a medical marijuana cultivation facility; RWP filed referendum REF-02-2021 to refer that rezoning to the November 2022 ballot.
- RWP submitted 2,288 signatures and the county recorder certified the petition; Jones sued under A.R.S. §§ 19-122(C) and 19-141(D), challenging (a) the petition’s form under § 19-101(A) and (b) sufficiency/validity of signatures.
- The parties agreed 1,064 valid signatures were required; Jones moved for summary judgment, seeking to disqualify a number of signatures for various defects (non-registered voters, mismatched addresses, duplicate signatures, circulator affidavit defects, illegibility, PO boxes, date errors).
- The trial court granted SJ as to some signature categories but denied SJ on others; at bench trial it found circulator Keith Leonard had given a false address on his affidavit and invalidated all sheets he circulated.
- Post-trial disputes involved 11–12 additional signatures and whether previously-disallowed duplicate signatures could be revived once Leonard’s sheets were invalidated; the trial court concluded there were 1,070 valid signatures (>1,064) and denied injunctive relief.
- Jones appealed, raising two principal challenges: (1) § 19-101(A) compliance (petition included the title twice and full text) and (2) whether enough valid signatures existed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compliance with § 19-101(A) — petition included title twice and whole rezoning text | Jones: Petition exceeded the required form, including surplus/full text was misleading; strict compliance required and surplus is fatal | RWP: Petition identified the rezoning measure; surplus (minutes/full text) permitted (§ 19-121(E)); extra detail helpful, not misleading | Court: Strict compliance is required, but surplusage not fatal here; petition met § 19-101(A) and dismissal on form challenge was proper |
| Mismatched addresses on 93 signatures — does discrepancy shift burden? | Jones: Address mismatches displace presumption of validity and shift burden to RWP to prove identity/validity | RWP: Address differences are not facially fatal; no genuine issue shown to shift burden | Court: Mismatches not facially fatal; moving party failed to meet SJ burden so no automatic burden shift; denial of SJ correct |
| Revival of previously conceded duplicate signatures after Leonard sheets invalidated | Jones: RWP waived right to revive duplicates by not contesting them earlier; reopening prejudicial | RWP: Could not foresee Leonard ruling; timely raised after sheets were invalidated; not waived | Court: No abuse of discretion — waiver doctrine inapplicable given interlocutory nature of orders and Jones had opportunity to respond; revival allowed |
| Interpretation of § 19-121.02(A)(8) — when a person signs more than once which signature is disqualified | Jones: Only the first-in-time signature should be counted; later signatures should be disqualified to prevent strategic backups | RWP: Statute requires counting one valid signature but does not specify which one; later valid signature may survive if earlier was invalidated | Court: Statute disqualifies "all but one otherwise valid signature" but does not specify which; trial court permissibly disqualified first-in-time signatures when appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Arrett v. Bower, 237 Ariz. 74 (App. 2015) (de novo review applies to statutory interpretation of referendum requirements)
- Sklar v. Town of Fountain Hills, 220 Ariz. 449 (App. 2008) (discussion of strict compliance and prior doctrine of broadly construing referendum terms)
- Pioneer Tr. Co. of Ariz. v. Pima County, 168 Ariz. 61 (1991) (surplusage on referendum petitions is not necessarily fatal where it does not create confusion)
- Direct Sellers Ass’n v. McBrayer, 109 Ariz. 3 (1972) (statute prescribes form and content of referendum petitions)
- Jenkins v. Hale, 218 Ariz. 561 (2008) (facially fatal defects: use of P.O. box instead of residential address)
- McKenna v. Soto, 250 Ariz. 469 (2021) (facially fatal defects: incomplete date entries on petition signatures)
- Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112 (App. 2008) (summary judgment burden-shifting principles)
- City of Tempe v. Fleming, 168 Ariz. 454 (App. 1991) (principles limiting judicial reading-in of statutory language)