Shan Kovaly v. Tulsidas Kurvanka, M.D. and Ikedinobi U. Eni, M.D., 01-15-00350-CV

Background

Plaintiff Shan Kovaly was discharged from Houston Northwest Medical Center on August 30, 2012, with prescriptions; pharmacy (Wal‑Mart) refused to fill because prescriptions omitted quantity and plaintiff could not reach prescribing physicians.
On September 4, 2012, Kovaly was readmitted with in‑stent thrombosis, allegedly from not taking prescribed Plavix; injuries from same episode underlie all claims.
Kovaly sent pre‑suit notice and a medical‑authorization to Wal‑Mart on July 23, 2013 (within two years), then sued Wal‑Mart July 25, 2013; later filed this suit against physicians (Drs. Eni and Kuruvanka) on November 11, 2014.
Wal‑Mart’s separate case resulted in summary judgment for Wal‑Mart; physicians moved for traditional summary judgment here, arguing the two‑year limitations period expired before suit was filed against them.
Trial court granted summary judgment for all defendants on statute‑of‑limitations grounds; appellant challenges that ruling, arguing pre‑suit notice to Wal‑Mart tolled limitations as to all potential defendants and appellant filed within the extended period.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held (trial court)
When did cause of action accrue?	Accrual no earlier than Aug 30, 2012 (discharge/deficient prescription).	Agreed accrual date (for purposes of SJ briefing).	Trial court proceeded on accrual dates and limitations calculations.
Does timely pre‑suit notice to one provider toll limitations for all potential defendants?	Yes — under De Checa and §74.051(c), notice to one tolls the statute for all parties for 75 days; tolling, not receipt of notice by each defendant, matters.	No — tolling applies only to the recipient; other defendants remain subject to the unextended two‑year period unless they received the authorization.	Trial court ruled limitations barred plaintiff's claims as to the physician defendants.
Is the adequacy of the medical‑authorization to nonrecipient defendants relevant to tolling?	No — adequacy for the recipient (Wal‑Mart) suffices to invoke the 75‑day tolling for all potential parties; remedy for a nonrecipient lacking an authorization is abatement, not dismissal.	Yes — because the authorization allowed only Wal‑Mart access, physicians argue tolling did not apply to them and they lacked proper authorization to get records.	Trial court treated limitations as not tolled for physicians and granted summary judgment.
Appropriate remedy when a defendant did not receive a compliant authorization?	Abatement is the statutory remedy (per §74.052 and De Checa), not summary judgment; plaintiffs can be allowed to cure or suit may be abated as to that defendant.	Contends summary judgment is proper because limitations expired for those defendants.	Trial court granted summary judgment (dismissal) on limitations grounds.

Key Cases Cited

De Checa v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 852 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1993) (notice to one health‑care provider tolls the limitations period for all parties and potential parties)
Thompson v. Community Health Inv., 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1996) (clarifies tolling under the Medical Liability Act and that tolling lasts 75 days)
Carreras v. Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. 2011) (holding that failure to include statutorily required authorization may prevent triggering tolling)
Sewell v. Adams, 854 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993) (applying rule that notice sent within two years tolls limitations for all defendants)
Mitchell v. The Methodist Hospital, 376 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (discussing abatement where authorization defects prevent invocation of tolling)