Shameca Robertson v. Allied Solutions, LLC
902 F.3d 690
7th Cir.2018Background
- Robertson applied to Allied, received a job offer, and Allied ran a pre-employment consumer/criminal background check before she reported to work.
- Allied sent disclosure/consent forms that Robertson alleges were not "clear and conspicuous" and contained extraneous information; she did not allege the extraneous info affected consent.
- The background report contained non-conviction information; Allied rescinded the offer and informed Robertson only that it was due to information in her criminal background report.
- FCRA §1681b(b)(3)(A) requires an employer to provide a copy of the report and a written summary of FCRA rights before taking adverse action based in whole or in part on a consumer report; Allied did not provide these to Robertson.
- Robertson sued on two class claims: (1) defective pre‑report notice/disclosure (notice claim) and (2) adverse‑action claim for failing to provide the report/summary before rescinding the offer.
- After a tentative settlement, the district court raised Article III standing (post‑Spokeo and post‑Groshek), dismissed the entire case for lack of jurisdiction; the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the notice claim but reversed as to the adverse‑action claim and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for notice claim (clear and conspicuous disclosure) | Robertson did not press standing but sought settlement approval; argued settlement could be approved despite Article III concerns | Allied argued no Article III injury; Groshek compels dismissal | Court: Plaintiff lacked Article III standing for the notice claim; district court dismissal affirmed |
| Standing for adverse‑action claim under §1681b(b)(3)(A) | Withholding the report deprived Robertson of a concrete, particular informational injury: loss of ability to review report and respond before adverse action | Allied argued plaintiff alleged only a procedural violation and failed to show concrete harm tied to lack of the report | Court: Reversed dismissal — withholding the report can be a concrete informational injury and Robertson alleged sufficient facts to survive dismissal |
| Ability of district court to approve settlement absent Article III jurisdiction | Robertson argued court could still approve the settlement reached before jurisdictional question arose | Allied maintained court lacked power to approve without Article III jurisdiction | Court: A court must have Article III power and subject‑matter jurisdiction before approving a settlement; cannot proceed absent jurisdiction |
| Leave to amend complaint after jurisdictional challenge | Robertson sought leave but did not specify facts she could add to cure standing deficiencies | Allied noted failure to propose concrete amendment; district court denied leave | Court: Denial of leave to amend affirmed — amendment would be futile because Robertson did not identify plausible missing allegations |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (federal injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury in fact traceable to defendant and redressable)
- Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (informational injuries can be concrete when withholding information impairs a substantive statutory purpose)
- Groshek v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 865 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2017) (Seventh Circuit held injury like the notice claim may be nonconcrete for standing)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (pre‑deprivation opportunity to present one’s side can be a meaningful procedural right)