Shamark Smith Limited Partnership, Sharon D. Marcus, and Paul J. Smith v. Martin M. Longoria
03-14-00698-CV
Tex. App.Apr 6, 2015Background
- Brothers Allen Chadwick Burbage (Chad) and W. Kirk Burbage (Kirk) had a long-running family dispute over ownership/control of the family funeral home and cemetery interests; Chad published accusations (website, letters, posters) alleging elder abuse, fraud, undue influence and other misconduct by Kirk.
- Kirk and the Burbage Funeral Home sued Chad for defamation (statements submitted as defamatory per se); the jury found for Kirk and the funeral home and awarded large compensatory and exemplary damages; the trial court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Chad from repeating specified statements.
- On appeal the court of appeals largely affirmed liability and damages (reducing exemplary damages); both parties sought review in the Texas Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court addressed (1) whether Chad’s communications were protected by a qualified (common‑interest) privilege, (2) whether the jury’s large compensatory award was supported by evidence, and (3) whether the trial court’s prohibitory injunction was permissible.
- The Court declined to resolve the qualified‑privilege issue because Chad failed to preserve a specific charge objection; it nonetheless held there was no evidence to support the $3.8 million compensatory award and that, because actual damages were unsupported, exemplary damages could not stand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Chad) | Defendant's Argument (Kirk/Burial) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a qualified (common‑interest) privilege protected Chad’s communications to the Phillipses and others | Communications were within a common‑interest context (family/cemetery matters) and thus privileged | Statements were defamatory per se; privilege not established or not applicable | Not reached on the merits — Chad failed to preserve a specific objection to the charge form; error not preserved |
| Whether the jury’s compensatory award ($3.8M) had legally sufficient evidentiary support | Damages were reasonably estimated by Kirk (testimony about lost business/reputation justified award) | Damages were speculative: no proof of actual loss, no credible valuation, cancellations unexplained | Reversed for no evidence of actual compensatory damages; award unsupported |
| Whether exemplary damages could be awarded | Exemplary damages appropriate given jury finding of malice | Exemplary damages require precedente showing of actual damages | Reversed — exemplary damages require actual compensatory damages and cannot be based on nominal damages alone |
| Whether the injunction barring future speech was proper | Injunction necessary to prevent ongoing harm to reputation and business | Permanent prohibitory injunction impermissibly restrains speech beyond remedial scope | Affirmed reversal of injunction — permanent prohibitory injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint under Kinney v. Barnes; injunction vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014) (Texas Supreme Court opinion addressing privilege, evidentiary sufficiency for defamation damages, exemplary damages, and prior restraint)
- Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2013) (presumed damages in defamation require evidentiary support beyond nominal damages)
- Waste Management of Texas, Inc. v. Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Ltd., 434 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2014) (evidence required to support reputation damages; CEO estimates and documentary indicators considered)
- Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002) (discussion of noneconomic damages in defamation and need for reasonable evidentiary basis)
- MBM Financial Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009) (where record shows only nominal damages, appellate court may render a take‑nothing judgment rather than remand)
- Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. 2014) (prohibitory injunctions restraining future speech are prior restraints and are subject to strict scrutiny; removal injunctions for previously adjudicated defamatory content are distinguishable)
