Shale Energy Alliance, Inc., a Delaware Corporation v. Mac Warner, West Virginia Secretary of State
20-0270
| W. Va. | Jun 14, 2021Background
- Shale Energy Alliance (SEA), a 501(c)(4) incorporated in 2015, described its mission to run public-education campaigns on oil/gas and to "advocate for candidates" aligning with its priorities.
- Between 2015–2018 SEA spent heavily on communications; in 2018 it reported $166,661.25 on election-related advertising, mailings, and polling and over $952,922 on advertising through 2018.
- The West Virginia Secretary of State notified SEA it may have violated disclosure and registration requirements by failing to register as a political action committee (PAC) under W. Va. Code § 3-8-1a(21) (2013).
- SEA made some disclosures and entered a partial settlement (including payment of certain penalties) but disputed that it was required to register as a PAC; the parties litigated that discrete statutory-interpretation issue by cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The circuit court held SEA met the 2013 statutory definition of a PAC ("a committee organized by one or more persons for the purpose of supporting or opposing... candidates") and ordered registration; the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. The court declined to address constitutional challenges as waived.
Issues
| Issue | Warner (Plaintiff) | SEA (Defendant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of "organized ... for the purpose" in § 3-8-1a(21): must candidate advocacy be the sole/primary purpose? | The 2013 statute is plain; it does not require "sole" or "primary" purpose—an entity can have other purposes and still be organized for candidate advocacy. | The statute requires that supporting/opposing candidates be the sole, primary, or major purpose; otherwise non‑singular-purpose groups would be unfairly regulated. | Majority: Statute unambiguous; court must apply plain meaning. "Organized for the purpose" does not import a sole/primary requirement; the 2019 amendment adding "primary purpose" confirms the Legislature changed the law later. |
| Whether SEA qualifies as a PAC under the 2013 statute based on its organization and activities | SEA’s bylaws, mission statements, staff/consultant network, and election‑cycle expenditures show it was organized to support/oppose candidates and thus must register. | SEA’s broader non‑electoral mission, selective accounting, and disputes over which expenses count demonstrate it was not organized for that purpose. | Majority: Undisputed record evidence (structure and expenditures—majority of certain election‑year spending on express advocacy) supports finding SEA is a PAC. |
| Reliability/assessment of the factual calculation (years selected, inclusion of polls, allocation of expenditures) | The court correctly relied on the undisputed record and was not required to re‑weigh minor accounting objections on summary judgment. | The court erred by focusing on selected years, misattributing spending, including polls, and not auditing each transaction. | Majority: Challenges are factual objections insufficient to defeat summary judgment; they do not undermine the legal conclusion that SEA was organized for candidate advocacy. |
| Constitutional challenges to § 3-8-1a(21) | Court should not decide constitutional issues not timely raised; SEA waived constitutional review. | SEA attempted to preserve constitutional arguments but did not litigate them below. | Held: Constitutional claims were waived; court declined to address them. |
Key Cases Cited
- Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (summary-judgment entry reviewed de novo)
- Center for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Ireland, 613 F. Supp. 2d 777 (S.D.W. Va. 2009) (federal district court interpretation that "the purpose" suggests singular-purpose organizations)
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (discusses permissible speech regulation tied to an organization’s major/primary purpose)
- Banker v. Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996) (courts may not add to or read into statutes words omitted by the Legislature)
- Butler v. Rutledge, 174 W.Va. 752, 329 S.E.2d 118 (1985) (legislative amendments using different language are presumed to change the law)
