756 S.E.2d 444
Va.2014Background
- Lamar Company leased property on Mayo Island, Richmond, and maintained a billboard visible from I-95; the Shaias own the land.
- The City of Richmond sought enforcement to remove or lower the billboard as nonconforming.
- Lamar and the Shaias filed declaratory-judgment actions asserting that under Va. Code § 15.2-2307 (the vested-rights statute), a structure for which taxes were paid for over 15 years cannot be declared illegal solely due to nonconformity.
- The City demurred, arguing the statute was merely enabling and required a local implementing ordinance before vesting any rights.
- The circuit court sustained the demurrers, holding the statute was merely enabling and plaintiffs’ claims were premature; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Supreme Court examined the statute’s plain language and reversed, holding § 15.2-2307 is restrictive (limits local authority) rather than merely enabling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Code § 15.2-2307 is merely enabling (requiring a local ordinance) or independently creates vested rights | § 15.2-2307 itself protects owners who paid taxes >15 years; no local ordinance is needed to invoke its protection | The statute is enabling legislation; localities must enact ordinances to implement its protections before rights vest | The statute is restrictive, not merely enabling; it forbids local ordinances from declaring such structures illegal solely for nonconformity and thus creates a substantive protection without requiring local adoption |
| Whether plaintiffs’ declaratory-judgment actions were premature | Plaintiffs’ rights arise under the statute now; relief is ripe | Claims are speculative absent a local implementing ordinance | Court rejected prematurity argument because the statute’s plain language creates the protection now |
Key Cases Cited
- Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96 (Va. 2007) (standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation)
- Laws v. McIlroy, 283 Va. 594 (Va. 2012) (use plain meaning of unambiguous statutory language)
- Marble Techs., Inc. v. City of Hampton, 279 Va. 409 (Va. 2010) (distinction between enabling and restrictive legislation under Dillon's Rule)
- Green v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 567 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (interpretation of the term "notwithstanding")