920 F.3d 624
9th Cir.2019Background
- In 1996 Shahid Mutee was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the district court applied the ACCA and imposed a 264-month sentence based on prior felony convictions.
- Mutee later moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after Johnson v. United States; two prior convictions were invalidated but three remained, including a North Carolina breaking-or-entering conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54.
- § 14-54 defines "building" to include dwellings, buildings under construction, curtilage, and “any other structure designed to house or secure within it any activity or property.”
- Mutee argued § 14-54 is overbroad for ACCA purposes because North Carolina cases had applied it to mobile homes and trailers, which he contended fall outside Taylor’s generic burglary definition.
- After briefing, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Stitt, holding generic burglary can include mobile structures adapted for overnight accommodation; the Ninth Circuit ordered supplemental briefing on Stitt’s effect.
- The Ninth Circuit held § 14-54 qualifies as an ACCA burglary predicate: North Carolina’s precedents treated the contested structures as permanent/immobile (or covered truly mobile items under a different statute, § 14-56), and Mutee failed to show a realistic probability the statute reaches non-generic burglary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a conviction under N.C. § 14-54 is a predicate "burglary" under the ACCA | Mutee: § 14-54 is overbroad because it has been applied to mobile homes/trailers that are not "buildings or structures" under Taylor | Gov.: § 14-54 substantially corresponds to generic burglary; mobile structures that qualify do so only when permanent/used for overnight accommodation | The conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate; Stitt forecloses the categorical exclusion of mobile structures when adapted for overnight use; Mutee failed to show realistic probability of overbreadth |
| Whether Ninth Circuit precedent requiring an "unmovable structure" remains good law after Stitt | Mutee relies on Grisel/Terrell to argue mobile structures are excluded from generic burglary | Gov. argues Stitt abrogates the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that structures be unmovable | Grisel/Terrell’s unmovable-structure rule is irreconcilable with Stitt and is overruled |
| Whether North Carolina decisions (Douglas, Bost) demonstrate § 14-54 covers nonpermanent/mobile items | Mutee: those cases show § 14-54 reaches movable trailers/mobile homes | Gov.: those cases treated the items as having become permanent/immobile; truly mobile items are covered by § 14-56 | The cited North Carolina cases involved structures deemed permanent/immobile; § 14-54 does not, as applied in those cases, reach non-generic burglary |
| Whether Mutee demonstrated a realistic probability that NC would apply § 14-54 to non-generic burglary | Mutee points to statutory language and case examples | Gov. points to limiting state interpretations and separate statute for mobile items | Court: Mutee failed to show a realistic probability of such application; conviction stands as ACCA predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) (generic burglary can include mobile structures adapted for overnight accommodation)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defines "generic burglary" for ACCA purposes)
- Grisel v. United States, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. en banc 2007) (previously required structures be intended for use in one place; abrogated by Stitt)
- United States v. Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (interpreted Grisel to require unmovable structure; overruled by Stitt)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (led to collateral attack on ACCA enhancements)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (standard for showing realistic probability a state statute reaches conduct outside the generic offense)