893 N.W.2d 319
Mich.2017Background
- BF was born in 2009 while Sharea Foster was married to Christopher Foster, creating a legal presumption that Christopher is the child’s father.
- Shae Graham filed a Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA) complaint on May 15, 2013, within the RPA’s alternate one-year limitations window that began June 12, 2012.
- Graham sought declarations that BF was born out of wedlock, that Graham is BF’s biological father, and an order of filiation naming Graham as BF’s legal father.
- Foster moved for summary disposition after the limitations period expired, arguing Christopher (the presumptive father) was a necessary party under MCR 2.205(A) and had not been joined within the limitations period, so the action was time-barred.
- The trial court held Christopher was not a necessary party; the Court of Appeals reversed that finding but allowed adding Christopher post-limitations under a purported “necessary‑party” exception and remanded; the Supreme Court affirmed that Christopher is a necessary party but vacated the Court of Appeals’ ruling that preemptively adjudicated Christopher’s potential statute-of-limitations defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Graham) | Defendant's Argument (Foster) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Christopher is a necessary party under MCR 2.205(A) | Not necessary because Graham seeks only to establish biological paternity | Necessary because naming Graham as legal father would require terminating Christopher’s parental rights | Christopher is a necessary party because the relief sought would affect his parental status; he must be joined |
| Whether a necessary‑party exception permits adding Christopher after the limitations period | The action was timely under RPA’s one‑year window; the suit may proceed and Christopher can be added | Graham’s failure to join Christopher within the limitations period bars the action | Court rejected preemptive use of a necessary‑party exception to defeat a limitations defense; joining is required but statute‑of‑limitations availability must be raised by Christopher if and when he is joined |
| Whether a party (Foster) can assert a statute‑of‑limitations defense belonging to a nonparty (Christopher) | Graham: Foster cannot invoke Christopher’s personal defenses to defeat the suit | Foster: May assert that failure to join Christopher within limitations period renders suit time‑barred | Statute of limitations is a personal defense; Foster cannot assert Christopher’s limitations defense on his behalf |
| Whether the Court of Appeals could adjudicate Christopher’s anticipated limitations defense before he was a party | Graham: Court of Appeals erred in deciding a nonparty’s defenses | Foster: Court of Appeals properly resolved the issue to permit continuation | Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ preemptive adjudication; Christopher must be made a party and may raise defenses himself on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Pecoraro v. Rostagno-Wallat, 291 Mich. App. 303 (Mich. Ct. App.) (presumption that a child born during marriage is child of the marriage)
- Miller v. Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich. 102 (Mich. 2007) (relation‑back doctrine does not apply to addition of new parties)
- Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109 (Mich. 1999) (standard of review for motions for summary disposition)
- Casserly v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 124 Mich. 157 (Mich. 1900) (statute of limitations is a personal defense)
- Yedinak v. Yedinak, 383 Mich. 409 (Mich. 1970) (court should not adjudicate rights of nonparties)
- Amer v. Clarence A. Durbin Assoc., 87 Mich. App. 62 (Mich. Ct. App.) (cases discussing joinder and necessary‑party principles)
- O’Keefe v. Clark Equipment Co., 106 Mich. App. 23 (Mich. Ct. App.) (discussing joinder and limitations issues)
- People v. Akins, 259 Mich. App. 545 (Mich. Ct. App.) (vacatur of appellate reasoning removes precedential effect)