Shader v. Hampton Improvement Ass'n.
94 A.3d 224
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2014Background
- Hampton subdivision (Plat No. 1, 1930) is subject to 1931 restrictive Covenants; Paragraph C limits uses to single‑family residences and provides “no more than one dwelling may be erected on a Lot.”
- Scott and Anna Shader bought a parcel (Lot 59 plus part of Lot 75), then in 2004 reconfigured it and recorded deeds creating addresses 606 and 606A East Seminary Ave.; they planned to sell/build on 606A.
- The Shaders sought declaratory relief against the Hampton Improvement Association (HIA) after HIA objected, arguing Paragraph C was waived by abandonment; they also relied on a prior circuit court decision (Duval) that had found waiver as to a different lot.
- The circuit court (after bench trial) denied the Shaders’ offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel argument based on Duval, found HIA had not abandoned the one‑house‑per‑lot restriction, and ruled Paragraph C barred construction on 606A.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed: collateral estoppel was inapplicable (issues not identical and Parklane factors made offensive estoppel unfair) and the trial court’s factual finding that HIA did not waive the one‑dwelling restriction was not clearly erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Shaders) | Defendant's Argument (HIA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Duval judgment collaterally estops HIA from litigating waiver by abandonment | Duval ruled HIA waived Paragraph C by abandonment; that ruling should preclude HIA here | Duval involved different lot/configuration and was limited to its facts; applying it offensively would be unfair | Court: collateral estoppel does not apply — issues not identical and Parklane factors make offensive nonmutual estoppel unfair |
| Whether Paragraph C was abandoned by acquiescence/abandonment so 606A may be built upon | Violative structures across Hampton (pool houses, guesthouses, sheds) show HIA abandoned enforcement of Paragraph C | HIA enforces one‑dwelling‑per‑lot; many structures are non‑residential appurtenances (not second residences) | Court: trial court’s finding that HIA did not abandon the one‑dwelling restriction is supported by the evidence (not clearly erroneous) |
| Whether selective enforcement of different clauses of Paragraph C is impermissible | If HIA abandoned enforcement of some building restrictions, it cannot selectively enforce the density clause | Paragraph C’s clauses are severable; enforcement of the one‑dwelling clause can persist despite other clause violations | Court: clauses are severable; abandonment of one clause does not require wholesale abandonment of all restrictions |
| Standard of appellate review for estoppel and waiver issues | Shaders urged reversal of pretrial denial of summary judgment on collateral estoppel | HIA argued trial court properly exercised discretion and factual findings control | Court: collateral estoppel application is a legal question reviewed de novo on sustainable facts; waiver (fact) reviewed under Rule 8‑131(c) for clear error; outcome affirms trial court |
Key Cases Cited
- Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (identifies factors making offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel potentially unfair)
- Burruss v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231 (2012) (applies Parklane factors and declines offensive nonmutual estoppel under unfairness concerns)
- MIE Props., Inc. v. City of Bowie, 398 Md. 657 (2007) (distinguishes waiver by abandonment from changed‑circumstances doctrine; waiver focuses on violative uses by other covenantors)
- Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 361 Md. 371 (2000) (collateral estoppel requires that issues were actually litigated and decided in prior action)
- Belleview Constr. Co. v. Rugby Hall Cmty. Ass'n, 321 Md. 152 (1990) (covenant interpretation governed by parties’ intent and plain language)
- King v. Waigand, 208 Md. 308 (1955) (restrictive covenants may be severable; abandonment of one restriction does not necessarily abandon another)
- Basiliko (Metro. Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko), 288 Md. 25 (1980) (pretrial denial of summary judgment premised on discretionary reasons reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Presbyterian Univ. Hosp. v. Wilson, 337 Md. 541 (1995) (legal questions raised in pretrial summary judgment denials reviewed de novo when pure issues of law)