Shabazz v. United States
923 F.3d 82
2d Cir.2019Background
- Petitioner Al-Malik Fruitkwan Shabazz sought rehearing after this Court reinstated his ACCA-based sentence, concluding his Connecticut robbery convictions qualified under ACCA's Force Clause.
- The District Court had initially vacated the original sentence, believing the Force Clause did not apply; the appellate panel later found ACCA enhancement proper under the Force Clause and reinstated the sentence.
- Shabazz argued our reinstatement conflicted with Villanueva v. United States and with Supreme Court precedent in Pepper, claiming the original sentence—imposed with reliance on ACCA's now-invalid Residual Clause—could not be lawfully reinstated because that reliance constituted structural error.
- The Panel considered whether (1) Villanueva prohibits reinstating an original sentence that relied on the Residual Clause, (2) Pepper requires remand for plenary resentencing here, and (3) reliance on the Residual Clause is a structural error not subject to harmless-error analysis.
- The Court rejected Shabazz’s claims, holding Villanueva did not mandate remand in all similar cases, Pepper permits limited remands, and any error from reliance on the Residual Clause was not structural because the Force Clause independently supported the same result.
Issues
| Issue | Shabazz's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Villanueva requires remand for full resentencing rather than reinstating an original sentence that relied on the Residual Clause | Villanueva implies remand for resentencing is required; reinstating an original sentence is impermissible | Villanueva remand was discretionary and did not preclude reinstatement where legally warranted | Villanueva did not prohibit reinstatement; remand there was discretionary |
| Whether Pepper compels plenary resentencing here or forecloses reinstatement | Pepper requires a full resentencing so post-sentencing rehabilitation and §3553(a) factors are considered anew | Pepper allows limited remands; it does not forbid reinstatement where the challenged aspect was legally correct on other grounds | Pepper permits limited remands; it does not bar reinstatement when Force Clause independently justifies the sentence |
| Whether reliance on ACCA’s Residual Clause (later invalidated) is a structural error | Reliance on an unconstitutional provision is structural and not subject to harmless-error analysis | Error is not structural if the same outcome is compelled by valid law (Force Clause); harmless-error review applies | Not structural; harmlessness applies because Force Clause independently compels the ACCA enhancement |
| Whether original sentence was prejudiced by the Residual Clause reliance | The sentence may have been imposed because of the Residual Clause, so reinstatement is improper | The Force Clause would have produced the same ACCA enhancement and 15-year minimum, so no prejudice | No prejudice shown; reinstatement appropriate because Force Clause supports the enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Shabazz v. United States, 912 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (panel’s prior decision reinstating ACCA-based sentence)
- Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (remand for resentencing after ACCA Residual Clause issues)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2009) (on remand courts may consider postsentencing rehabilitation at plenary resentencing)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (struck down ACCA Residual Clause as void for vagueness)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Sentencing guidelines and remedial resentencing framework)
- Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006) (distinction between structural errors and those subject to harmless-error review)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (prejudice standard for harmless-error analysis)