Shaarei Tfiloh v. Mayor & Council of Baltimore
183 A.3d 845
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2018Background
- Maryland enacted Envir. § 4-202.1 (2012) requiring Phase I MS4 jurisdictions to establish watershed protection programs, a local fund, and a “stormwater remediation fee” to fund compliance with EPA/TMDL obligations; Baltimore City adopted Article 27 effective July 1, 2013.
- Article 27 levied charges on non-exempt properties: single-family on tiered flat rates; all other properties at $15/quarter per ERU (1 ERU = 1,050 sq ft impervious surface), with a minimum 1 ERU and reduced rates for qualifying religious structures.
- Shaarei Tfiloh Congregation was billed for three properties and challenged the assessment administratively as an unconstitutional property tax and as burdening religious exercise; DPW reduced but denied voiding the fees; the Board affirmed DPW; the Circuit Court held the charge is a tax but an authorized excise tax and rejected constitutional claims.
- Central legal questions: (1) whether the City exceeded its enabling authority in enacting Article 27; (2) whether the charge is a fee or a tax (and if a tax, whether property or excise); (3) whether Article 27 implicates RLUIPA or Maryland Article 36 free-exercise protections; (4) whether the Board followed its procedures.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed: City acted within delegated authority; the Stormwater Fee is in substance a tax (primary purpose revenue-raising) but is an excise tax (based on use — impervious surface), not a property tax; RLUIPA and Article 36 challenges fail; no procedural violation by the Board.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to enact Article 27 | City exceeded Envir. § 4-202.1 because assessment method and exemptions produced inflated charges and lacked required nexus to property’s share of services | Envir. § 4-202.1 authorized creation of fund and assessment; statute permits flat, graduated (impervious area), or other methods and allows exemptions | City did not exceed delegated authority; Article 27 fits § 4-202.1’s purpose and methods |
| Tax vs. Fee (regulatory/user fee) | Charge is a tax: labeled fee but imposed for revenue, involuntary, benefits public generally | City: charge funds stormwater program and can be structured like fee, excise, or regulatory tax under enabling statute | Despite label, charge is a tax (primary purpose revenue-raising; benefits general public) |
| Type of tax: property tax vs. excise tax | It is a property tax (assessed by reference to property, result in lien) and Congregation is tax-exempt under Tax-Prop. § 7-204 | It is an excise tax because it is based on particular use (impervious surface), not property value or ownership | Tax is an excise tax: based on use (impervious area), not valuation; thus Tax-Prop exemption inapplicable |
| Religious claims (RLUIPA / Article 36 / procedure) | Fee imposes substantial burden on religious exercise and Article 27 is a land-use regulation under RLUIPA; Board ignored submitted water bills and failed procedures | Article 27 is not a land-use regulation (does not restrict land use); law is neutral and generally applicable under Free Exercise precedent; plaintiff did not submit sufficient financial evidence; Board followed procedures | RLUIPA inapplicable (not a land-use regulation); Article 36 free-exercise standard follows federal neutral/general applicability test per controlling precedent; no procedural violation or adequate evidence of substantial burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Eastern Diversified Properties, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 319 Md. 45 (1990) (distinguishes regulatory fees from taxes; development-impact charge characterized as unauthorized tax)
- Weaver v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 349 (1977) (framework for distinguishing property taxes from excise taxes)
- Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery County, 337 Md. 15 (1994) (applies Weaver; explains operation/effect and incidence tests for excise vs. property tax)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (free-exercise doctrine: neutral and generally applicable laws need not satisfy strict scrutiny)