Seymour v. Collins
2015 IL 118432
| Ill. | 2015Background
- Terry and Monica Seymour filed a personal-injury suit (May 20, 2011) after Terry was injured in an ambulance collision on June 3, 2010; defendants included the ambulance crew, ATS Medical, and driver Bradley Collins/Rockford Country Club.
- The Seymours had a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filed April 24, 2008; their plan was confirmed and modified several times, including a March 19, 2010 modification (related to reduced income from a May 2009 work injury).
- Plaintiffs did not notify the bankruptcy court of Terry’s June 3, 2010 accident, the subsequent workers’ compensation claim, or the later-filed state-court personal-injury suit during the pendency of the Chapter 13 plan.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing judicial estoppel barred plaintiffs’ suit because they failed to disclose the claim to the bankruptcy court.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment applying judicial estoppel; a divided appellate panel affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and reversed, remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judicial estoppel bars the personal-injury suit for failure to disclose the claim in Chapter 13 | Seymour: omission was not intentional, no oath-based misstatement, and trustee/attorney advised only lump-sum reporting >$2,000; no benefit was obtained from nondisclosure | Defendants: Chapter 13 imposes a continuing duty to disclose postpetition claims; nondisclosure was inconsistent and benefitted debtors by preserving discharge without creditor notice | Court: Judicial estoppel not warranted here — although duty to disclose exists and prerequisites could be met, record lacks clear evidence of deliberate intent to deceive; summary judgment was improperly granted |
| Whether a statement under oath is required to invoke judicial estoppel | Seymour: no sworn false statement; doctrine should require an oath for such estoppel | Defendants: oath not necessary; objective inconsistency and intent can be shown otherwise | Court: No oath requirement — a sworn statement is not necessary for judicial estoppel to apply; intent and other Runge factors control |
| Whether plaintiffs obtained a benefit from nondisclosure (element of judicial estoppel) | Seymour: trustee would not have altered plan or taken action; no funds were received during plan; value of an unliquidated postpetition claim is speculative | Defendants: nondisclosure prevented creditors/trustee from objecting or modifying plan and permitted a discharge without notice of a potential asset | Court: Benefit element not established on these facts; trustee’s affidavit and circumstances indicated no practicable benefit and valuation was speculative |
| Proper standard of review when judicial estoppel is invoked via summary judgment | Seymour: de novo review because summary judgment was the vehicle | Defendants: abuse-of-discretion because applying an equitable doctrine is discretionary | Court: Hybrid approach — trial court must first find the Runge prerequisites (factual), then exercise discretion whether to apply estoppel; appellate review: abuse of discretion of the equitable choice, but summary-judgment dismissal is reviewed de novo; here trial court failed to meaningfully exercise discretion so reversal is required |
Key Cases Cited
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (describing purpose of judicial estoppel and circumstances for its application)
- People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68 (2009) (Illinois listing of five prerequisites generally required for judicial estoppel)
- People v. Caballero, 206 Ill. 2d 65 (2002) (discussion of judicial estoppel principles and courts’ concern with oath and integrity)
- People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569 (2006) (citing prerequisites and equitable nature of judicial estoppel)
- Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248 (2004) (summary-judgment standard and de novo review principles)
- Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064 (2012) (summary-judgment doctrine: deny when reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences)
- Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154 (2007) (summary judgment is drastic and movant’s right must be clear and free from doubt)