Seybert v. Alsworth
367 P.3d 32
| Alaska | 2016Background
- Five Lake and Peninsula Borough voters sued borough mayor Glen Alsworth Sr. and assembly member Lorene Anelon alleging failures to disclose conflicts, votes on matters with personal/business interests, and deficient financial disclosures under AS 39.50, borough charter/code, common-law conflict doctrine, and Alaska consumer-protection law.
- The amended complaint contained five counts: three alleging violations of AS 39.50 and implementing regs; one alleging borough charter/code and common-law conflict violations; and one alleging unfair/deceptive trade practices.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies before APOC; the superior court granted summary judgment as to the AS 39.50 counts and stayed the other counts pending APOC review, relying in part on primary jurisdiction principles.
- Plaintiffs contended exhaustion was not required because AS 39.50.100 creates an express private right of action; they also argued APOC lacked exclusive jurisdiction and administrative remedies would not provide all requested relief.
- The Alaska Supreme Court granted review and reversed: exhaustion was not required given the parallel citizen-suit provision, and the record did not establish primary jurisdiction as an alternative basis to affirm the stay/summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies before APOC is required before bringing a citizen suit under AS 39.50.100 | Seybert: AS 39.50.100 grants a private right of action; statute permits parallel administrative and judicial remedies so exhaustion is not required. | Alsworth/Anelon: Statutory administrative remedies exist and the exhaustion doctrine (and agency expertise) requires APOC be given first opportunity. | Court: Reversed superior court — exhaustion not required; legislature created parallel remedies and did not indicate exhaustion prerequisite. |
| Whether the superior court permissibly stayed litigation under primary jurisdiction doctrine | Seybert: APOC lacks exclusive jurisdiction; invoking primary jurisdiction would subvert the citizen-suit intent and is not warranted here. | Alsworth/Anelon: Even if exhaustion isn't mandatory, the court could use primary jurisdiction to stay the case to let APOC decide technical aspects and uniformize outcomes. | Court: Primary jurisdiction is discretionary; record did not establish as a matter of law that a stay was required. Factors (agency expertise, risk of inconsistent rulings, impact on agency functions) did not favor a mandatory stay. |
| Whether remedies sought (e.g., fines, injunctive relief, forfeiture, disgorgement) are exclusively within APOC's authority | Seybert: Court can adjudicate and, if necessary, refer fine determinations to APOC; citizen suit reasonably contemplates meaningful remedies. | Alsworth/Anelon: Some remedies (e.g., fine determinations) are statutorily allocated to APOC, so judicial relief is incomplete without agency action. | Court: Rejects argument that availability of some APOC-only remedies compels exhaustion or precludes court adjudication; simultaneous jurisdiction can be accommodated. |
| Whether prior APOC practice or likelihood of APOC action supports deferral | Seybert: APOC historically dismissed similar complaints and may not investigate; hence little risk of conflicting or useful agency action. | Alsworth/Anelon: APOC has expertise and sanctioning authority that weigh in favor of deferral. | Court: Historical APOC inaction and the nature of the claims (statutory interpretation; not agency rulemaking) undermine the need for primary jurisdiction here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. City of Anchorage, 504 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1972) (describes primary jurisdiction doctrine permitting courts to stay litigation to let agencies address matters within their expertise)
- Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (U.S. 1993) (explains primary jurisdiction applies where an issue lies within an administrative agency's special competence)
- Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 761 P.2d 119 (Alaska 1988) (discusses when exhaustion/administrative remedies may be appropriate in land-use/permit contexts)
- Matanuska Elec. Ass’n v. Chugach Elec. Ass’n, 99 P.3d 553 (Alaska 2004) (recognizes primary jurisdiction as prudential and discretionary)
- Winterrowd v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 288 P.3d 446 (Alaska 2012) (addresses standard that exhaustion-of-remedies is a legal question reviewed de novo)