754 F.3d 332
E.D. Mich.2014Background
- Brian Sexton, a plant general manager and ERISA-plan trustee, emailed his company’s board chairman complaining that the board’s refusal to seat newly elected directors and removal of trustees violated ERISA, and threatened to notify the Department of Labor unless remedied.
- Sexton took no further steps after the unsolicited complaint; six months later he was fired. He sued in Michigan court under the State Whistleblower Protection Act and for breach of contract.
- The employer removed the suit to federal court invoking ERISA complete-preemption, recharacterizing Sexton’s state whistleblower claim as an ERISA § 510 claim (29 U.S.C. § 1140). Sexton did not contest removal and litigated the ERISA claim in federal court.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, holding Sexton’s unsolicited complaint was not protected by § 1140; the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Sixth Circuit majority read § 1140’s protection as limited to persons who “give information” or “testify” in an inquiry or proceeding (i.e., participation in investigations/hearings), not to unsolicited internal complaints made outside any inquiry or employer request.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ERISA § 1140 protects unsolicited internal complaints to an employer about ERISA violations (i.e., does "given information in any inquiry" cover such complaints?) | Sexton: § 1140 protects employees who complain about violations regardless of whether the complaint occurred within an investigation or in response to an inquiry; protection should be broad like other anti-retaliation statutes. | Panel Processing: § 1140’s text protects participation in inquiries/proceedings (giving information or testifying in an inquiry); unsolicited complaints outside any inquiry are not covered. | Court: Affirmed defendant — § 1140 does not protect unsolicited complaints made outside any inquiry or proceeding. |
| Whether the Secretary of Labor’s contrary interpretation warrants deference | Secretary: agency interpretation (Skidmore) supports covering unsolicited complaints to effectuate whistleblower protection. | Defendants: enforcement of § 1140 lies with private causes of action; Chevron deference is inapplicable; the Secretary’s briefs are unpersuasive. | Court: No Chevron deference; Skidmore-level respect declined — Secretary’s position unpersuasive. |
| Whether legislative purpose or policy supports a broad reading to protect whistleblowers | Sexton/Secretary: broader reading furthers enforcement and protects whistleblowers; Supreme Court precedent (Kasten, Crawford) favors expansive protection of anti-retaliation provisions. | Panel Processing: statutory text controls; many anti-retaliation statutes explicitly include an opposition clause, but ERISA does not — courts must respect Congress’s chosen language. | Court: Purpose and policy cannot overcome the clear textual limitation to information/testimony given in inquiries or proceedings. |
| Whether circuit precedent creates ambiguity justifying broader interpretation | Sexton: Circuit splits (Fifth, Seventh, Ninth) show ambiguity; under Kasten ambiguous antiretaliation provisions should be construed to protect employees. | Panel Processing: other circuits (Second, Third, Fourth) interpret § 1140 narrowly; this case’s text and context point to the narrower reading. | Court: Disagreement among circuits does not establish ambiguity sufficient to rewrite § 1140; text resolves the question here in favor of the employer. |
Key Cases Cited
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (preemption doctrine converts certain state-law ERISA claims into federal claims)
- Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011) (interpretive approach to anti-retaliation provisions; oral complaints may be protected under FLSA given context)
- Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (Title VII opposition clause protects employees who answer questions during investigations)
- George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., Inc., 694 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2012) (post-Kasten holding that § 510 can protect unsolicited internal complaints)
- Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010) (§ 510 does not protect unsolicited internal complaints; protection limited to employer-initiated inquiries)
- King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003) (§ 510 limited to formal administrative or legal proceedings, not intra-company complaints)
- Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005) (limited § 510 protection to information given in employer-initiated inquiries)
- Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993) (construed § 510 to cover internal complaints that are the normal first step toward formal inquiry)
- Anderson v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognized § 510 protects employees who provide information relating to ERISA violations)