Sexton v. Local Police & Fire Retirement System
2016 Ark. App. 496
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Harold Planchon was a Springdale firefighter (hired 1987) who worked fires, investigated causes, and served on Hazmat; diagnosed with colon cancer in 2009 and worked until 2011.
- Records and expert letters showed daily occupational exposure to carcinogens (including diesel fumes) and several treating physicians and an IAFF occupational-medicine resident stated the exposures were a likely cause of his colon cancer.
- LOPFI retained an oncologist, Dr. Balan Nair, who concluded occupational causation was plausible but not definite; LOPFI awarded nonduty (not duty-related) disability benefits based on lack of definitive causation.
- The LOPFI Board upheld the nonduty decision, stating the medical opinions relied on statistical increased risk and did not firmly establish causation; the circuit court affirmed.
- Procedural history: Planchon appealed; he died before submission, revivor/substitution of his estate was eventually permitted, and the appeal continued with Jane Sexton as personal representative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Planchon proved his colon cancer "arose out of and in the course of" his employment (statutory duty-disability standard) | Sexton: exposure and treating doctors' opinions establish a causal connection; increased occupational risk suffices. | LOPFI: studies show only increased risk; plaintiff failed to prove definite causation—Board need not infer causation from risk alone. | Court held Board applied too-strict a standard; statute requires causal connection, not absolute certainty; remanded for further proceedings. |
| Whether the Board improperly required absolute medical certainty or language beyond reasonable medical probability | Sexton: Board ignored treating opinions and demanded certainty. | LOPFI: Board did not require absolute certainty; it reasonably found opinions relied on statistics only. | Court found Board effectively required a higher certainty than statute and precedent allow. |
| Whether statistical/epidemiological evidence and treating physician opinions can support causation absent definitive proof | Sexton: yes—circumstantial and medical opinion beyond speculation may suffice. | LOPFI: statistics alone are insufficient to "connect the dots." | Court: causal connection can be established without absolute proof; remanded to apply proper standard. |
| Whether substantial-evidence standard supports Board's denial | Sexton: record of physicians and exposure is substantial evidence of duty causation. | LOPFI: record lacks definitive proof; substantial evidence supports Board's finding. | Court: Board's reasoning relied on misstatement of law; decision reversed and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ford Motor Co. v. Arkansas Motor Vehicle Commission, 357 Ark. 125, 161 S.W.3d 788 (standard of review for administrative decisions)
- Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (medical causation need not use magic words; opinion must be more than speculation)
- Howell v. Scroll Technologies, 343 Ark. 297, 35 S.W.3d 800 (medical opinion expressing a greater-than-50% causal probability meets standard)
- Rose Care, Inc. v. Ross, 91 Ark. App. 187, 209 S.W.3d 393 (circumstantial evidence can establish proximate cause)
- Williams v. Johnson Custom Homes, 374 Ark. 457, 288 S.W.3d 607 (remand required where administrative body relied on incorrect legal standard)