Settoon Towing, L.L.C. v. Marquette Transportation Co.
859 F.3d 340
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Collision on Feb. 22, 2014: Settoon’s tow (tanker barges) and Marquette’s tow (grain barges) entered a radio "one-whistle" overtaking agreement on the lower Mississippi; barges collided, spilling ~750 barrels of crude and closing a 70-mile stretch of river for ~48 hours.
- Coast Guard designated Settoon as the OPA "Responsible Party," so Settoon performed and paid for cleanup and related claims under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).
- Settoon filed limitation proceedings; Marquette filed a claim; Settoon counterclaimed seeking contribution from Marquette under the OPA and maritime law.
- The district court found both parties negligent and apportioned fault 65% to Marquette, 35% to Settoon, and held that a Responsible Party can obtain contribution under the OPA for purely economic cleanup costs.
- Marquette appealed, arguing (1) OPA does not permit a Responsible Party to obtain contribution for purely economic damages (invoking Robins Dry Dock limitation), and (2) the apportionment of fault was clearly erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Settoon) | Defendant's Argument (Marquette) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OPA permits a Responsible Party to obtain contribution for purely economic damages (cleanup costs) | OPA §2709 authorizes contribution “under this Act,” so a Responsible Party can recover apportioned shares of all costs it paid, including purely economic losses; Congress broadened recovery beyond Robins Dry Dock. | Section 2709 merely preserves contribution but contribution rights arise from general maritime law, which (per Robins Dry Dock) bars recovery for purely economic loss; OPA only provides subrogation when a third party is solely at fault. | Court: OPA allows contribution “under this Act,” including for purely economic cleanup costs; Section 2709 is a self-contained grant of contribution against those "liable or potentially liable" under the Act. |
| Proper standard/meaning of "potentially liable" under OPA for contribution suits | "Potentially liable" should include parties who had a role in causing the discharge and thus may be sued for contribution even before final fault determinations. | "Potentially liable" should not be read to create OPA-based contribution where liability otherwise is governed by general maritime law and Robins Dry Dock. | Court: "Potentially liable" includes those who may be liable under the Act (analogous to CERCLA interpretation), permitting contribution claims against joint tortfeasors under OPA. |
| Whether the OPA’s savings clause preserves maritime law over OPA contribution provision | OPA’s savings clause preserves maritime law only where OPA is silent; where OPA addresses contribution (§2709), OPA controls. | Savings clause means admiralty remedies (including maritime contribution rules) remain available, limiting OPA’s effect. | Court: Savings clause does not override explicit OPA contribution provision; OPA displaces maritime rule to the extent it speaks to contribution. |
| Whether district court’s apportionment (65% Marquette / 35% Settoon) was clearly erroneous | Settoon advanced evidence supporting apportionment (district court saw credibility and factual weight). | Marquette argued overtaken/give-way vessel (Settoon) should bear greater or majority fault based on precedent. | Court: Apportionment not clearly erroneous; appellate review is deferential and district court’s fact-findings stood. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sobranes Recovery Pool I, LLC v. Todd & Hughes Constr. Corp., 509 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.) (standard for de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. FLORA MV, 235 F.3d 963 (5th Cir.) (standard for reviewing apportionment of fault in maritime collision)
- Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) (traditional maritime bar on recovery of purely economic loss)
- Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.) (application of Robins Dry Dock in this circuit)
- United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 759 F.3d 420 (5th Cir.) (discussing Responsible Party status under OPA)
- Unocal Corp. v. United States, 222 F.3d 528 (9th Cir.) (interpreting OPA subrogation when a third party is solely at fault)
- OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574 (5th Cir.) (interpreting "liable or potentially liable" under CERCLA contribution provision)
- Crowley Marine Servs., Inc. v. Maritrans, Inc., 530 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.) (example of appellate allocation of fault in overtaking collision)