Settendown Public Utility, LLC v. Waterscape Utility, LLC
324 Ga. App. 652
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Settendown and Butler appealed an order disqualifying Butler from representing Settendown in Waterscape’s suit.
- Waterscape moved to dismiss the direct appeals as interlocutory and failing to follow immediate-review procedures.
- The court held no conflict in Georgia law and relied on Cherry v. Coast House to classify the disqualification order as interlocutory.
- The Stevens decision was deemed not controlling for direct appealability and Cherry/Lassiter govern the issue.
- Because the order is interlocutory and procedures were not followed, the appeals are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- Relief from an erroneous disqualification order is available on final judgment through a new-trial or other post-judgment remedies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the disqualification order directly appealable? | Settendown/Butler rely on Stevens for direct appeal. | Cherry/Lassiter control; disqualification orders are interlocutory. | Disqualification order is interlocutory; not directly appealable. |
| Does collateral order doctrine apply to the disqualification order? | Potential direct appeal under collateral-order theory. | Collateral order doctrine does not apply; review available on final judgment. | Collateral order doctrine does not apply; review available after final judgment. |
| Were the interlocutory-appeal procedures properly followed? | Settendown sought immediate review; timing issues unresolved. | Procedures for interlocutory appeal not followed; jurisdiction lacking. | No jurisdiction; appeals dismissed as premature. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cherry v. Coast House, Ltd., 257 Ga. 403 (1987) (disqualification orders are interlocutory; direct appeal requires proper procedure)
- Lassiter Properties v. Davidson Mineral Properties, 230 Ga. App. 216 (1998) (adopts Cherry on interlocutory status of disqualification orders)
- Stevens v. Thomas, 257 Ga. 645 (1987) (text relied on by Settendown not controlling for direct appealability)
- American Gen. Financial Svcs. v. Jape, 291 Ga. 637 (2012) (recognizes appellate jurisdictional limits in collateral context (concurring))
- Ewing Holding Corp. v. Egan-Stanley Investments, 154 Ga. App. 493 (1980) (interlocutory appeals for disqualification cited in reasoning)
- Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829 (2013) (collateral-order analysis and review on final judgment guidance)
- Expedia v. City of Columbus, 305 Ga. App. 450 (2010) (noting relief obtainable on appeal from final judgment)
- Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368 (1981) (final-judgment rule and relief after appeal)
- Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424 (1985) (collateral-order doctrine limits emphasized)
- Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978) (illustrates collateral-order principle)
- Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100 (2009) (collateral-order doctrine scope)