Sessions v. Morales-Santana
137 S. Ct. 1678
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- At the time relevant to this case, 8 U.S.C. §1401(a)(7) required a U.S.-citizen parent (married couple context) to have 10 years physical presence in the U.S., at least 5 after age 14, to transmit citizenship to a child born abroad; Congress later reduced that rule to 5 years (with 2 after age 14) for births after 1986.
- 8 U.S.C. §1409(a) made §1401’s rules applicable to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers; §1409(c) created a special exception for unwed U.S.-citizen mothers allowing transmission on proof of only 1 continuous year of U.S. residence prior to birth.
- Luis R. Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic in 1962; his father, a U.S. citizen from Puerto Rico, left the U.S. 20 days short of meeting the §1401(a)(7) 5-years-after-14 requirement, so Morales-Santana was treated as an alien and placed in removal proceedings years later.
- Morales-Santana moved to reopen removal proceedings arguing the gendered differential (shorter residency requirement for unwed mothers than for unwed fathers) violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee; the Second Circuit agreed and held he derived citizenship from his father.
- The Supreme Court held the gender-based distinction violates the Fifth Amendment but declined to rewrite the statute to extend the one-year exception to fathers; instead it applied the longer general rule prospectively to children of unwed mothers until Congress provides a uniform rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Morales-Santana may assert his father’s equal-protection claim (third-party standing) | Morales-Santana can vindicate his deceased father’s right because of a close relationship and the father’s inability to sue (death) | Government opposed third-party standing in related contexts | Court: Third-party standing permitted — close relationship and hindrance (father deceased) satisfied |
| Whether §1409’s different physical‑presence rules for unwed mothers and fathers violate equal protection (Fifth Amendment) | The gender-based residency differential is based on outdated stereotypes and lacks an "exceedingly persuasive justification" required under heightened scrutiny | Government defends the differential as serving important interests: ensuring a child’s connection to the U.S. and preventing statelessness | Court: The gender-based classification fails heightened scrutiny and is unconstitutional |
| Whether precedents (Fiallo, Miller, Nguyen) require deference to Congress here | Morales‑Santana distinguishes those cases (citizenship-at-birth claim; different factual predicates) and argues those precedents do not control | Government relied on those cases to justify differential treatment and deference | Court: Those cases do not control; Nguyen and Miller concerned acknowledgment requirements, and Fiallo involved immigration preferences, not citizenship-at-birth claims |
| Appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation | Extend §1409(c)’s one‑year exception to unwed fathers, recognizing citizenship for those like Morales‑Santana | Government urged either judicial restraint or a remedy that preserves Congress’ general residence policy | Court: Remedy limited — cannot judicially convert the exception into the rule; instead, apply the general longer physical‑presence requirement prospectively to children of unwed mothers and leave uniform change to Congress |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (heightened scrutiny standard for gender-based classifications and requirement of an "exceedingly persuasive justification")
- J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (all gender-based classifications receive heightened review)
- Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (classifications granting benefits by reference to sex of qualifying parent attract heightened scrutiny; remedy options include extension or withdrawal of benefits)
- Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating sex-based administrative preference)
- Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality recognizing sex as suspect classification in benefit contexts)
- Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating Social Security discrimination against fathers; gender-based benefit denial unconstitutional)
- Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding paternal-acknowledgment requirement as substantially related means to an important interest; distinguishes acknowledgment from duration-of-residence rules)
- Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (upholding immigration preferences under broad congressional power over immigration; limited relevance to citizenship-at-birth claims)
- Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (remedial framework: courts should, when possible, implement what legislature would have done when cure is required)
- Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (Congress’s emphasis on residence as evidence of attachment to the United States)