213 Conn.App. 151
Conn. App. Ct.2022Background
- In 2008 a fire destroyed a house owned by the estate of Johnson Lee; Sessa claims personal property of his was lost and included in an insurance claim submitted by the then‑administrator Gustafson.
- Gustafson received $966,000 in insurance proceeds (including $188,595.07 attributed to Sessa) but did not pay Sessa; in 2010 the Probate Court issued a decree allowing up to $9,210.97 to be paid to Sessa if he submitted an affidavit of ownership.
- Gustafson resigned; in 2015 successor administrator Reale rejected Sessa’s claim in full.
- Sessa filed an application in Probate under §45a‑364 to hear and decide the rejected claim; on January 14, 2016 the Probate Court denied that application, stating the 2010 decree was dispositive.
- Sessa then filed an appeal from probate to the Superior Court under §45a‑186; the Superior Court granted the estate’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that §45a‑364(b) required Sessa to commence a civil suit instead of a probate appeal.
- The Appellate Court affirmed, holding the Probate Court had denied the application (triggering §45a‑364(b)) and the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over a §45a‑186 probate appeal from such a denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Probate Court decided the merits of Sessa’s rejected claim (permitting an appeal under §45a‑186) or denied the application (triggering §45a‑364(b) and requiring suit) | Sessa: Probate Court effectively decided the claim on the merits by invoking the 2010 decree and law‑of‑the‑case, so appeal under §45a‑186 was proper | Estate: Probate Court expressly denied the application; §45a‑364(b) applies and claimant must commence suit in Superior Court | Held: The Probate Court expressly denied the application; §45a‑364(b) applies; Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the §45a‑186 probate appeal |
| Whether failure to satisfy the §45a‑364(b) time requirement must be raised as a special defense rather than by motion to dismiss | Sessa: Time‑bar/filing‑requirement should be treated as a special defense (not subject matter jurisdiction) | Estate: Proper to raise lack of jurisdiction by motion to dismiss because the remedy chosen (a §45a‑186 appeal) invoked only the limited probate appeal jurisdiction | Held: Issue properly raised by motion to dismiss; court need not entertain the hypothetical special‑defense argument because Sessa never filed the §45a‑364(b) suit |
Key Cases Cited
- Connery v. Gieske, 323 Conn. 377 (2016) (probate court's powers are strictly statutory and limited)
- Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523 (2012) (overview of statutory procedures for presenting and pursuing claims against estates)
- Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69 (2008) (principles for construing judgments and orders)
- Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, 308 Conn. 312 (2013) (discussion of the law‑of‑the‑case doctrine)
- HUD/Barbour‑Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650 (1995) (statute prescribing a particular procedure implies prohibition of alternative procedures)
- Bailey v. Medical Examining Board for State Employee Disability Retirement, 75 Conn. App. 215 (2003) (standards for appellate review of motions to dismiss)
- Corneroli v. D’Amico, 116 Conn. App. 59 (2009) (recognition that Superior Court exercises limited, statutory jurisdiction on appeals from probate)